Babcock v. Kijakazi (20-480)
argument 20-480Babcock v. Kijakazi
Supreme Court of the United States
53 min
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the statutory text that defines the uniformed service exception?
We'll hear argument next in Case 2480, Babcock v. Kijikaze. Mr. Cotill.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. I'd like to begin with the statutory text. Section 415A7A is found at Petition Appendix Page 69A, and it excludes from the windfall elimination provision, quote, a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service, as defined in Section 410M. David Babcock, who served as a dual-status technician in the National Guard for 33 years, qualifies. Indeed, 32 U.S.C. 709 requires technicians like him to literally... quote, wear the uniform of the armed services, be a member of the National Guard, and hold the military grade specified by the Secretary. And Babcock did. He wore the U.S. Army uniform day in, day out, teaching people how to fly Black Hawk helicopters and the like.
Babcock engaged in service. He was a dual-status tech. He's undoubtedly a member of a uniformed service. Indeed, the Section 410M states, expressly says National Guard folks qualify. The government says Babcock was a civilian. Even if this were true, it would be irrelevant. The key statute, 415, doesn't use a civil versus military dividing line. It simply asks, was the service uniformed? The government attempts to say that Babcock's service was not as wholly a member of the uniformed service. But the best reading of the statute, even before one gets to the veteran's canon, rejects that. There is no status language in 415 the government would convert the word as into a status test, trying to discern what hat someone was wearing at a given point in time.
Congress certainly could have made such a choice, and indeed it has in many other statutes, but it did nothing like that here. So we have three basic arguments. One, the statute doesn't look to civilian status. It looks to uniform service. Second, even if civilian status mattered, this would meet it. Dual status tech service is irreducibly military. And third, if there's any ambiguity, the Veterans Canon would suggest reading it in favor of Mr. Babcock.
Counsel, if — just a simple factual question. If he — If a petitioner was receiving his — was exclusively uniformed service, then why is he receiving a civilian pension and a military pension?
Yeah, that's just the way the statute works. And Justice Thomas, it's very much like something that's common ground between both the government and us, which is that inactive service members who didn't pay into the system would receive both. That's what Congress certainly had in mind and the uniformed service
exception. That's not exactly. Part of it's civilian and part of it is military. If your argument is right, it would seem that it would be all military. That makes sense if you're talking about NOAA or you're talking about the Coast Guard. It's consistent with what you're saying, that the service was uniform service, as opposed to part civilian, since he's wearing more than one hat. It is a dual position. So part civilian, part military. And I don't understand how you could have that. and now argue that it's all military?
Well, we're saying, Your Honor, that it's all uniform service. That's the language of 410M. And so it does certainly have some civilian overtones. Civilian versus uniform service are not mutually exclusive
categories. Is there any other service where that's the case?
Other
than this?
Well, NOAA and the Public Health Service.
But they're designated by statute, right? Correct. And petitioner is not?
No, Justice Thomas. It is designated by statute just as much. So the National Guard is enumerated. Congress specified in the uniformed service exception certain services that were defined as uniformed, and that's 410M. And when you look at 410M and the cross-reference, it says that NOAA and public health services are certainly included, but so too is the National Guard of the United States. Now, Justice Thomas, you're absolutely right. There is no other category besides dual-status technicians that fall within our argument
about 410M. Petitioner is not acting as a member of the National Guard of the United States all the time.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the statutory text that defines the uniformed service exception?
0:00–6:25
2
How does the government argue that Babcock’s service was civilian, not uniformed?
6:25–13:10
3
What are the three basic arguments presented by counsel for Babcock?
13:10–19:07
4
How do the justices question the distinction between civilian and military paychecks?
19:07–24:50
5
What role does the Veterans’ Canon play in interpreting ambiguous statutory language?
24:50–31:25
6
How does the dual‑status technician’s employment structure affect the windfall elimination provision?
31:25–39:46
7
What historical reasons led to the creation of the dual‑status technician position?
39:46–47:44
8
How many individuals could be impacted by the Court’s decision on this case?
47:44–53:16