Betterman v. Montana (14-1457)

argument 14-1457

Betterman v. Montana

Supreme Court of the United States 57 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Court’s position on whether the Speedy Trial Clause applies through sentencing?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in Case 14-1457, Betterman v. Montana. Mr. Rowley.

Raul P. A. Rowley 0:10

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Speedy Trial Clause applies to a criminal prosecution through its culmination in sentencing. It is not cut off when the defendant pleads or is found guilty. The Court has said that the clause guarantees an early and proper disposition of a criminal charge. And that guarantee applies to the guilt stage of a prosecution, when most defendants plead guilty, and to the sentencing stage, which may be the only place in a criminal prosecution today when a defendant actually mounts a defense.

Unknown 0:45

Does the Federal Speedy Trial Act, not the constitutional provision, but the legislation, does that cover sentencing or is that limited to trial?

Raul P. A. Rowley 0:57

Your Honor, my understanding is that it's limited to trial. The Court has recognized specific interests that are protected by the speedy trial clause, and those interests apply not just to presumptively innocent defendants, as the State and the United States suggest, but some of them apply specifically to guilty defendants. In Barker, for instance, the Court notes that one of the interests that is protected by this clause is the interest in rehabilitation and that a prolonged period of detention in jail can affect a defendant's rehabilitation. Well, that's specific to a guilty defendant. And in Smith v. Huey, the court noted that even though the defendant had been incarcerated in federal prison, that that defendant could still be prejudiced by a prolonged delay in the state prosecution that followed because it could affect his ability to seek a concurrent sentence.

Raul P. A. Rowley 1:55

That interest also is specific to a guilty defendant. So this sharp line between the guilt stage of a prosecution and the sentencing stage of a prosecution isn't supported by this Court's speedy trial precedent.

Unknown 2:10

What do you do with all of our speedy trial decisions? Say there's only one remedy, and that is case over. Dismissal is the only appropriate remedy. But you're not arguing that, I understand, with respect to sentencing.

Raul P. A. Rowley 2:32

MR. Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE GINSBERG.

Unknown 2:33

You are

Raul P. A. Rowley 2:33

arguing — MR. No, we were not arguing

Unknown 2:35

that. JUSTICE GINSBERG. So it's different — the speedy trial requirement says if you don't comply with the constitutional provision, dismissal. But you're saying sentencing is not the same as trial, to that extent that the remedy is different.

Raul P. A. Rowley 2:52

MR. MR. At the guilt stage of the prosecution, the outcomes are binary. So the defendant is either adjudicated guilty or the charges are dismissed or the defendant is acquitted. So there's two possible outcomes at the guilt stage, guilt or innocence. At sentencing, the situation is quite different. There's greater opportunity for tailoring, which is what the Court requires per Morrison, and there may be a greater need for tailoring because the defendant has been adjudicated guilty. So in the sentencing context where courts have wide discretion, where there's a range of possible sentences, where there's a range of possible outcomes, there's greater opportunity for tailoring. So

Anthony M. Kennedy 3:34

what would the remedy be in a case like this?

Raul P. A. Rowley 3:37

Your Honor, we submit that a proper remedy in a case like this would be to reduce Mr. Betterman's sentence by the period of delay in the Montana Supreme Court concluded that the period of unjustified delay here was 14 months.

Unknown 3:50

Well, he was serving on another sentence. He was serving a sentence for another crime.

Raul P. A. Rowley 3:55

Yes, Your Honor. So he got time served credit on the prior sentence that he was serving. But that period of delay, the 14 months, was not credited to his sentence on the bail jumping sentence, which is the sentence that's at issue here. And we submit that a proportionate remedy, an appropriate remedy, would be to reduce that sentence by the period during which he was denied access to rehabilitation programs and suffered the anxiety that is detailed in his affidavit, and that that would be a way to go. The lower courts have applied that sort of remedy to sentencing delays. And another possible outcome in another case would be simply to vacate the remaining portion of the defendant's sentence.