Biden v. Texas (21-954)

argument 21-954

Biden v. Texas

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 47m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal dispute between the Biden administration and Texas?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument first this morning in Case 21-954, Biden against Texas. General Preligar.

Unknown 0:07

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The Secretary of Homeland Security exercised his statutory discretion to make a policy judgment. He found that the benefits of MPP were outweighed by its domestic, humanitarian, and foreign policy costs. Yet the lower courts ordered DHS to reinstate MPP in perpetuity, requiring ongoing negotiations with Mexico to send thousands of noncitizens into its territory. That was error. On the first question, Section 1225 confers a discretionary return authority that the Secretary may use, not a mandate. Nothing in the statutory text or history compels DHS to use MPP whenever Congress fails to provide sufficient funds for universal detention. Respondents identify no one who interpreted Section 1225 this way before this lawsuit, no member of Congress or executive branch official or anyone else.

Unknown 1:03

And on this reading, every presidential administration in an unbroken line for the past quarter century has been an open violation of the INA. The Court's interpretation compels sensitive foreign policy negotiations and would require transformative changes to the government's border operations. If Congress had wanted to mandate those results, it would have spoken clearly. On the second question, respondents have abandoned virtually all of the District Court's reasons for finding that the October 29 termination decision has no legal effect. Texas now concedes that DHS was permitted to respond to the District Court's remand by issuing a new decision. That's just what the Secretary did following a multi-week reconsideration process.

Unknown 1:47

Respondents claim that the Secretary didn't really have an open mind in that process, but the APA doesn't impose an amorphous open-mindedness requirement, and respondents have not carried their heavy burden to show that the October 29 decision was pretextual. This Court should reverse the judgment below, and the Secretary should be allowed to finally put his policy decision into effect. I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:12

General, below you argued 1252F1 and its limitation on who could impose injunctions here. And it seems as though you've abandoned that. But what should we do with that provision in this case?

Unknown 2:31

Well, Justice Thomas, we included a footnote in our opening brief in this case to make clear that we were continuing to press our Section 1252F1 argument. Of course, we recognize the Court is considering that issue in the Aleman-Gonzalez case, but we continue to adhere to the position that the district court in this case had no authority to enter the injunction that it did because that would enjoin or restrain the operation of the INA, and only this court has jurisdiction to enter an injunction like that.

Clarence Thomas 2:57

You emphasized the foreign relations concerns that arise in this case, but we've said in previous cases that Congress has plenary authority in this area, Beyond that, if Congress has already legislated in this area and expressed those concerns, then what additional concerns should we take into account?

Unknown 3:23

Well, Justice Thomas, I think that the particular interpretation of the statute that the district court adopted here implicates grave and serious foreign policy implications. Of course, the executive branch has primary responsibility for managing foreign relations and conducting those kinds of negotiations. And I think that if Congress had intended to override the executive's ordinary discretion that it enjoys with respect to that kind of foreign policy relationship, then at the very least it should have made that intent express in the statute. But instead, if you look at the text of Section 1225B2C, this is the contiguous territory return provision, what Congress said is that the Secretary may return.

Unknown 4:00

Congress in no sense indicated that it was actually imposing on the executive a mandate— to engage in those kinds of ongoing negotiations with Mexico, not just to obtain its consent at the outset, but the enormous investment of diplomatic resources that it takes to engage with Mexico on a day-to-day basis to implement this policy, then Congress should at least have said that clearly in the statute.