Birchfield v. North Dakota (14-1468)

argument 14-1468

Birchfield v. North Dakota

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 11m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗

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What constitutional issue do the North Dakota and Minnesota statutes raise?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We look at our argument first this morning in Case 14-1468, Birchfield v. North Dakota, and the related cases. Mr.

Unknown 0:09

Rothfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The fundamental problem with the statutes at issue in these three cases is that they make it a criminal offense to assert a constitutional right. Under the laws of North Dakota and Minnesota, a person who is stopped on suspicion of impaired driving is obligated to take a warrantless chemical test to determine the alcohol content of their blood. The States concede that these tests are searches under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The United States and North Dakota appear to recognize that no exception — none of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement applies. Nevertheless, a person is obligated to take this warrantless — to submit to this warrantless search and is committing a criminal offense if he or she does not do so.

Unknown 0:50

JUSTICE BREYER. Is it correct to say that you concede that the State could revoke the driver's license for refusing to take the test, either blood alcohol or breathalyzer. That is not an issue in this case. We haven't taken a position on that, but we don't dispute for purposes of this case that the State could do that. Well, let's assume that that is a concession or that we hold that or that that's a premise. If the State can impose a civil administrative sanction, why can it also impose a criminal sanction? And we could have hypotheticals where you — It would just be no more than three days in jail, criminal sanction, or a three-year suspension, which is obviously great. Why should there be a difference?

Unknown 1:34

I think the fundamental distinction that governs the outcome of this case, we think, is that between the State taking away a benefit that it didn't have to give you in the first place, which is what the Court addresses in the unconstitutional conditions line of cases. And this situation here, in which the State is saying by fiat, you are subject to a criminal penalty, affirmative criminal penalty for asserting a constitutional right. In the case that you're hypothesizing — Well, I think the conditions are just different. I don't think that analytically — that analytically it's a different proposition. But I have to disagree with that, Your Honor, for this reason. I think that in the unconstitutional conditions line of cases, what the Court has said is the State has given someone a benefit that it did not have to give in the first place.

Unknown 2:22

And all the state is doing when it takes that benefit away is saying you're back in the position that you were to begin with. There is no sort of direct penalty that's attached to what the individual is doing. And the court in those cases has said we will look to see the practical effect of the combination of the benefit and the condition to see whether or not the state in reality is trying to do indirectly what it could not do directly, that being the suppression of a constitutional right. And so in those cases, the court will look to say, What is the degree of the connection between the benefit and the condition? We'll look to see the degree of coercion that the State's manipulation of the benefit and condition imposes on the individual to surrender a constitutional right.

Unknown 3:02

But as the Court has made very clear in this entire line of cases, what it's trying to do is to figure out, is the State trying to do indirectly something that it could not do directly, which is advocate a constitutional right?

Samuel A. Alito 3:13

In this case — the State is doing is not to criminalize the assertion of a constitutional right, but to criminalize reneging on a bargain. And the bargain was we give you a license to drive, and in exchange for that you consent to a — to a blood alcohol test under certain circumstances. And if you renege on that bargain, then that's what's criminalized. Why isn't that a better way of looking at this?

Unknown 3:40

I think to look at it that way, I think that you're sort of in the world of consent. In this case, at least, there is no suggestion that consent of that sort was present.