Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC (23-51)
argument 23-51Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries Park St., LLC
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the Federal Arbitration Act’s worker exemption and how did the Court interpret it in Southwest v. Saxon?
We'll hear argument next in case 2351, Bissonnette v. LePage Bakeries. Ms. Bennett?
Thank you. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, less than two years ago in Southwest v. Saxon, this Court carefully examined the text and history of the Federal Arbitration Act's worker exemption, and it held that the exemption applies to, quote, any class of workers directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders. Flowers now asks this court to add an additional unwritten requirement, that the worker's employer must sell transportation. According to Flowers, if the thousands of truck drivers who work full-time hauling its goods were only employed by a trucking company that Flowers had hired to do so, then they'd be exempt transportation workers. But because Flowers essentially created its own in-house trucking company,
It says that those same truck drivers are no longer transportation workers. That distinction has no basis in the text of the statute. Flowers' only attempt at a textual argument is its invocation of a justum generis. But that argument fails from the start because Flowers can't identify a single example of the word semen ever being defined based on whether a worker's employer sold transportation. In fact, if Flowers' drivers were on boats rather than trucks, under Flowers' own definition of seamen, they would be seamen. In the words of Saxon, that sinks the company's a eustim generous argument. Unable to rely on the text, Flowers pivots to administrability. But even if this court could rewrite statutes to make them easier to apply, Flowers' rule is anything but workable.
Flowers can't even explain how it would apply in this very case. This court should reject Flowers' attempt to add to the FAA an employer-based industry requirement that is both atextual and unworkable. I welcome this court's questions.
If this case is decided in your favor, would it affect a separate question of whether or not these drivers are engaged in intrastate deliveries?
No, I don't think it would. The only question, as this case comes to the court, built into the question presented is the assumption that the workers are members of a class of workers engaged in intrastate commerce. It wouldn't affect that at all. The only question here is, assuming that to be true, Is there an additional requirement that the individual plaintiffs be employed by a company that's in the transportation industry?
So why would the inquiry into transportation industry be any more complicated than the inquiry into transportation workers?
So by transportation workers, I take it you mean whether someone is directly involved? So I think there are certainly going to be edge cases about whether a class of workers is directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders. We can see that. But what Flowers is asking is that we adopt an additional requirement on top of that that wouldn't obviate that inquiry. So take, for example, Amazon. So It has trucks traveling across the highway. It has planes in the air. Maybe there's a difficult question about whether those, you know, say truckers are directly involved in transporting goods across borders. But what Flower says is in addition to figuring out that question, we also have to figure out whether Amazon sells transportation
So how do we know? Do we need discovery into whether it sells transportation? Does it matter who it sells it to? Does it just have to sell it to its customers? Does it have to sell it to other companies? Does it matter how much transportation it sells? Does it matter what percentage of its prices and revenues? All of these are going to be difficult questions that are then layered on top of the question you raised, which is already in the text of the statute. And so in an Amazon's case, for example, it doesn't get us out of the question you raised. It just adds an additional one on top. In your
opening, you emphasized the text quite a bit.
Yes, Your
Honor. In Houston Generous cases, by definition, we're not following the literal text of the residual clause.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Federal Arbitration Act’s worker exemption and how did the Court interpret it in Southwest v. Saxon?
0:00–8:05
2
Why does Flowers argue that an employer‑based “transportation‑industry” requirement should be added to the exemption?
8:05–16:18
3
Does a decision in favor of Flowers affect whether the drivers are engaged in intrastate deliveries?
16:18–24:32
4
How does the Court distinguish between “transportation workers” and other employees when applying the exemption?
24:32–31:29
5
What historical statutes (Shipping Commissioners Act, Railway Act) tell us about the original meaning of “seaman” and “railroad employee”?
31:29–38:02
6
Why is an employer‑based industry test considered unworkable and contrary to the statute’s purpose?
38:02–45:48
7
How might modern companies like Amazon, Domino’s, or medical‑industry firms fit into the transportation‑worker analysis?
45:48–53:15
8
What are the justices’ final questions and how does the Court plan to resolve the “last‑mile” and industry‑definition issues?
53:15–1:00:17