Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (20-1472)

argument 20-1472

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 7m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Court’s position on whether the 30‑day limit is jurisdictional?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument this morning in case twenty fourteen seventy two, Beckler versus the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Ms. Sherry?

Ms. Sherry 0:10

Mr Chief Justice, and may I please the court. This Court has repeatedly held that time limits are rarely jurisdictional, and that if Congress wants to make them jurisdictional, it has to speak clearly. Section sixty three thirty D one does not have the needed clarity. The first clause reads like an ordinary statute of limitations. It says what the taxpayer may do, and it says nothing about the tax court's jurisdiction. The second clause does speak to jurisdiction, but the only reference back to the first is through the two words such matter. Now we think such matter refers to a petition to the tax court for review of a CDP determination. The Commissioner agrees, but he says it also refers to the thirty day deadline to file that petition.

Ms. Sherry 0:57

Our reading is more natural, it stops at the closest reasonable antecedent, and it uses the word matter as it's ordinarily understood. The Commissioner's reading requires more work. And it requires this court to treat the time limit the same as subject matter in the context of subject matter jurisdiction. If nothing else, it is far from clear. The statutory history resolves any doubt. As originally enacted, the same time limit governed the tax court and the district courts, and it was not jurisdictional. The relevant language has not changed. It has to mean the same thing today as it did in nineteen ninety eight. Congress enacted this collection due process regime in order to protect taxpayers from IRS abuses.

Ms. Sherry 1:42

It would not have included a rare and harsh jurisdictional deadline to close those courthouse doors, let alone through a vague parenthetical reference to such matter. And equitable tolling easily follows from that. That is the presumption and it is not overcome here. The limitations period looks just like the one in Irwin, and it looks nothing like the deadlines in Brocamp. The C D P regime is remedial. and it is a place where equity finds a comfortable home. I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:16

Um Ms Sherry, um why would Congress uh permit the tax court to take into to consider an untimely action uh but then not allow it to enjoy uh uh an a levy uh action.

Ms. Sherry 2:36

So I think that goes to that final sentence in E one. And our view is that the word timely in that final sentence is not self defining. When you E one does not decide what is timely. If you want to decide what is timely, you have to look at the statute of limitations itself in D one. And the rules that govern that statute of limitations. That includes things like the mailbox rule, it includes statutory tolling, and so and it includes equitable tolling. And so our view is whether or not equitable tolling is available is a separate question, but E one doesn't answer that. And so just to directly answer your Honor's question, our reading of the final sentence in E one is that it gives the tax court authority to enjoin as long as

Ms. Sherry 3:18

it has authority to actually decide the merits of the case. And if equitable tolling is available and warranted, Then those petitions are deemed timely under that final sentence. And so the incongruity that the Commissioner points to, we just don't think exists. We think looking at the language of the statute of limitations itself in D1, we think we have the better reading of that language, but we think at the very least, uh the Commissioner's reading is very far from clear. The statutory history we think is really compelling here. It's on page fourteen A of the Blue Brief and if you look at that language at the time, it's the very same thirty day time limit. It just applied to two different courts.

John G. Roberts 4:00

Before you get too far along on the uh legislative history I want to focus a little more on the actual language. Um As that reads, it's not just a a filing rule. It refers to the jurisdiction of the Court and how that jurisdiction is confirmed. It's by the filing within thirty days. I mean I understand if it were a provision that said the petition for review shall be filed within thirty days and and this you know take it from there.