Borden v. United States (19-5410)

argument 19-5410

Borden v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 12m 9 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s force clause?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument next in case nineteen fifty four ten, Borden versus United States. Mr Shadmagam.

Eric M. Shadid (Mr. Shadmagam) 0:08

Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. This case concerns the interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Acts Force Clause. The most natural reading of that clause is that it reaches only uses of force that are intentionally or knowingly aimed at another person. The force clause therefore does not reach a person who uses force recklessly, because such a person is indifferent as to whether the force used falls on another person or on no one at all. Such an interpretation not only is compelled by the text of the force clause, but is supported by its broader context, namely to define the phrase violent felony and to identify those repeat offenders who are likely to point a gun at someone in the future.

Eric M. Shadid (Mr. Shadmagam) 0:48

And thus warrant a minimum of fifteen years in prison. Until recently, our interpretation was the uniform interpretation of the courts of appeals, which relied on the text of the force clause and this court's decision in Liacal construing it. That was seemingly settled law, and it gave rise to no apparent problems with the statutes reach. But in the wake of this court's decision four years ago in Floisine, some courts of appeals, including the court below, reversed course and adopted a contrary interpretation. Those courts were mistaken. In Voisine, this court was interpreting different statutory language in a wholly different context, and it expressly reserved the question presented here. The government advocates an interpretation of the Force Clause that is grossly overinclusive, sweeping in offenses such as reckless driving and thereby dramatically expanding the scope of the Act.

Eric M. Shadid (Mr. Shadmagam) 1:40

The text of the Force Clause does not support that interpretation, and it certainly does not unambiguously dictate it. At a minimum, given that every court of appeals had until recently rejected the government's interpretation, this court should apply the rule of lenity and hold that the force clause excludes reckless offenses. Whether as a matter of plain text or as a matter of lenity, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. I welcome the Court's question.

John G. Roberts 2:07

Thank you, Mr Shan Magam. Um you you rely heavily on Leocal, um and its statement just to quote, that it's not natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident. I'm not sure I understand that. I if I'm uh you know, at a sports event and jump up and wave my arms cheering and hit the person next to me, uh haven't I employed physical force against that person by accident?

Eric M. Shadid (Mr. Shadmagam) 2:35

Perhaps, Mr. Chief Justice, because in that hypothetical the use of force is volitional, but we're really relying on a separate aspect of Leah Cow's reasoning. That is that the against phrase is the critical and key phrase that limits the use of physical force. and that defines the necessary degree of intent. And that's really how to reconcile Liacal with Voisine. In Voisine, the court was interpreting a statute that lacked that limiting language, and the court appropriately relied on the aspect of Liacal's reasoning to which you point, in holding that the unlimited language reaches more broadly.

John G. Roberts 3:13

Well what about something that's uh in in recklessness? Uh you know, if I'm uh As part of a prank, I'm swinging a bat at at someone, of course, meaning not to hit them, but you know, the bat slips and it does hit them. Uh y you'd certainly say that the conduct was reckless and you'd say that it's directed against another person. So why isn't recklessness uh uh enough under that standard?

Eric M. Shadid (Mr. Shadmagam) 3:40

I would certainly say in that hypothetical, Mr Chief Justice, that you have used physical force, but I would not say that you have used physical force against the person of another. Um and the government's alternative uh interpretation I would respectfully submit really reads the against phrase out of context. We're not disputing that Well, I don't understand

John G. Roberts 4:01

that. If I'm swinging the bat at him, I'm certainly and it and it ends up hitting him, I'm using physical force, I'm doing the swinging and it's against him.