BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore (19-1189)

argument 19-1189

BP p.l.c. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 15m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗

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What statutory question does Section 1447(d) raise in the BP v. Baltimore case?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will now hear argument in case nineteen eleven eighty nine BP PLC versus the mayor and city council of Baltimore. Mr Shamagan.

Unknown 0:10

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. This case presents a question of statutory interpretation involving the provision authorizing appellate review of certain remand orders. The relevant provision of section 1447 D authorizes appellate review of a remand order where a ground for removal was the Federal Officer or Civil Rights Removal Statute. By its plain terms, the statute permits review of the entire order, not particular issues. The Court of Appeals' contrary interpretation is invalid. Respondent offers virtually no textual defense of that interpretation, relying instead on case law, policy, and an alternative interpretation. But those arguments cannot trump the statutory text and in any event lack merit.

Unknown 0:56

As to case law, this court and the courts of appeals have consistently interpreted statutes permitting appellate review of an order to authorize plenary review and respondents to contrary examples involve unique considerations. As to policy, the plaintext interpretation is consistent with Congress's special solicitude for cases involving civil rights and federal officers. That interpretation accords with the background principle of plenary review, would lead at most to marginal additional delay, and could actually expedite resolution of the appeal. And as to respondent's alternative interpretation, a defendant removes a case pursuant to the federal officer removal statute when it invokes the statute in its notice of removal, regardless of the merits of that ground.

Unknown 1:42

The sole remaining question is how best to dispose of the statement. this case. The court should reverse the judgment below because respondents' claims necessarily arise under federal law. This court's precedents dictate the common sense conclusion that federal law governs claims alleging injury caused by worldwide greenhouse gas emissions. The Court of Appeals should have reached that ground for removal, and it should have held that the case was removable on that basis. The Court of Appeals judgment should therefore be reversed. I welcome the Court's question.

John G. Roberts 2:11

Counsel, you just said that the uh your theory applies regardless of the merits of the uh Federal officer or the Federal Civil Rights basis for uh removal. But what if the those bases are uh uh frivolous, uh uh that uh everybody who wants to keep their case in federal court and put in as many grounds for removal as they can, and they have to all they have to do is attack on one of these Federal Officer, Federal Civil Rights uh uh grounds. Um is that right?

Unknown 2:43

In that circumstance, sanctions and fee awards would be available as they always are whenever a litigant makes frivolous arguments, and a party could be subject to sanctions up to dismissal. Mr. Chief Justice, I don't think there's any evidence that uh parties uh engage in that conduct in the circuit that most clearly has adopted our rule, the Seventh Circuit. There's simply no evidence of that. Well what if

John G. Roberts 3:07

it's what if it's beyond frivolous? What if the Court of Appeals just says, you know, uh I think we ought to look at this and if there turns out they're wrong about the uh uh federal officer basis, we'll just send it back and we don't have to consider all these other possible grounds.

Unknown 3:22

Well, I don't think that a court can do that because the statute obligates an appellate court to consider all of the grounds for removal. And it contemplates a situation like this where the federal officer or civil rights ground may not have merit. That is why the use of the word order is so significant. And to uh uh adopt a respondent's interpretation, Congress would have had to to make clear that the question or issue of federal office or or civil rights removal was all that was available on appeal and Congress obviously did not do that.

John G. Roberts 3:57

Justice Thomas.

Clarence Thomas 3:59

Uh thank you, Mr Chief Justice. Um Mr Shanmigan, the um I'd like to uh I may have um Missed your last point.