Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty. (16-466)
argument 16-466Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the California Supreme Court’s jurisdiction rule that Bristol‑Myers is challenging?
Your argument first this morning in case sixteen four four four four four six six six six six six six six six six six Bristol Myers Squib Company versus the Superior Court of California.
Mr.
Cottio?
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The California Supreme Court ruled that hundreds of plaintiffs who were not prescribed a drug in California, who did not take it in California, who lacked any injury in California, and who had no other connection to California could sue in California. The court reasoned there was a sliding scale whereby the defendant's other conduct with other Californians could establish specific jurisdiction. Those concepts have some footing in the law. That footing is limited to general jurisdiction, which is lacking here, and this court has never permitted specific jurisdiction in such circumstances, which is presumably why respondents don't bother defending the California Supreme Court.
Instead, they meant a whole new test, never before seen by any court, whereby an ad hoc reasonableness inquiry with any number of undetermined balancing factors will create jurisdiction.
Uh that Almost, not quite, perhaps, takes away the due process argument which Basically has to be the argument that you're making here.
Justice Kennedy, I don't think that's actually what we conceded. Um what we did say is that the reasonability uh reasonableness inquiry is with respect to the third kind of safety valve factor. We didn't make the argument with respect to the third prong, but we absolutely did. make the argument that jurisdiction here was unreasonable below. At pages four and eighteen in the Court of the California Supreme Court brief, we made very clear we said it would, quote, offend basic notions of federalism and fairness. At page four, at page eighteen, we said instead of achieving jurisdictional fairness, their rule would redistribute the burden of defending mass torts in a lopsided way. So
we absolutely did. How is it unreasonable? Yes. No. You're not fighting the pendant jurisdiction. permits a court. to take multiple claims of damages nationwide or even worldwide. And even unrelated causes of action. and bring them to a jurisdiction, correct? by one plaintiff. So You're not you're not claiming that that offends due process.
Pendant jurisdiction, at least personal jurisdiction is only applied in some federal courts by dint of common law. We're absolutely fighting it and it's not the law in any court, any state court anywhere, the pendant personal jurisdiction.
So how do you deal so you're saying that pendant jurisdiction for claims that in some way are connected. violates due process? You are going further?
We are saying that there has to be a causation between the underlying cause of action. Every
single individual action. So you are destroying pendant jurisdiction on every level.
We are not destroying it. There is no ca there is no pendant jurisdiction for state claims as it exists right now. This court has said time again, starting with international shoe, the relevant locus of analysis, Justice Sotomayor, is always my cause of it.
Let's put it aside. But I'm
just saying that that has been the the law in all what we have. But
your position right now is that in no suit Will one court, say court, ever be able to hear the entire controversy between a plaintiff and a defendant?
Oh, definitely not. Heavens me, that is not our position at all, Justice Otamayor. So for example, every place in which there is general jurisdiction, you can have that court. Only
when there is general jurisdiction.
No, not o g that's one place. So Delaware for example here, but there's also the ability for specific jurisdiction in places in which the underlying activity was launched. So here they have for example deceptive market.
For example, the the drug that that everyone bought all over the country was manufactured in one place, even though it wasn't the principal place of business or the place of incorporation.
Right. It may be that that's enough for specific jurisdiction, depending on what the underlying claim is exactly, Justice Ginsburg.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the California Supreme Court’s jurisdiction rule that Bristol‑Myers is challenging?
0:00–7:37
2
How do the parties argue whether specific personal jurisdiction exists in California?
7:37–14:51
3
Why do the justices focus on fairness and due‑process concerns in this case?
14:51–22:45
4
What role does the nationwide distribution by McKesson play in the jurisdiction analysis?
22:45–29:57
5
How might mass‑tort coordination and multi‑district litigation affect jurisdictional fairness?
29:57–37:37
6
What are the arguments about predictability and federalism for the parties?
37:37–44:51
7
How do the justices propose a rule to balance minimum contacts with state interests?
44:51–52:53
8
What potential outcomes could the Supreme Court’s decision have on future mass‑tort cases?
52:53–1:00:49