Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (19-1257)
argument 19-1257Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 54m
9 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the core dispute over Arizona’s voting practices in the Brnovich case?
We will hear argument this morning in case number nineteen twelve fifty seven, Bernovich versus Democratic National Committee and the consolidated case. Mr. Carbon.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. I think the key conceptual point here to understand is that Arizona has not denied anyone any voting opportunity of any kind. This is not like a literacy test which denies you the right to vote. It's not like vote dilution where uh white block voting denies minorities an equal opportunity to elect. Everyone here is eligible and registered to vote all they have to do is utilize the myriad opportunities that Arizona's offered them over twenty seven days to vote by mail for free or in person. And since there's no denial of opportunities, this is a disparate impact claim that would not even be cognizable in other contexts. Under Title VII, disparate impact relates to a denial of an employment opportunity, a job or promotion.
It doesn't get involved in the process. No one's ever brought a Title VII claim saying you can't require people to send in applications because minorities have less access to transportation and mail, analogous to the claim being made here. So respondents are trying to move disparate impact into an entirely different context. Since there's no denial of any voting opportunity in this context, the circumstances in which time, place, and manner rules uh can violate section two are extraordinarily limited. They only occur if the state has organized the time, place and manner rules and stacked them in such a way that minorities have less opportunity than non-minorities to cast their votes. That comes directly from
on the plain language of section two, and it's also, of course, as a practical matter, the only circumstance in which the state has erected any kind of cognizable barrier to minority voting. uh respondents alternative view uh is at war with the text of section two. Section two says again, voting practices cannot provide less opportunity. They say that voting practices which provide the same opportunity are nonetheless unlawful if external socioeconomic factors somehow contribute to disproportionate But that language is nowhere in the text and was never even mentioned in the legislative history, which is quite notable. Mr.
Mr Carvin, um as I understand your test as you've just articulated it It reduces to anything dealing with time, place, or manner, it's an intent test rather than a results test that's provided under Section 2. In other words, uh so long as it's a time, place, or manner restriction, uh it's only when there's a difference uh in its uh uh between uh minority voters um and white voters that you You have a problem. Is that not true?
Y not entirely, uh Mr Chief Justice, for this reason. It does involve differential systems, unequal access, but regardless of whether or not that unequal access was racially motivated, you would not have to prove that the intent behind the differential access provided to minorities was to uh suppress or hinder the minority vote and that's a key distinction um from uh Um Uh Mobile versus Bone.
Uh you you talk about um the concern being that the analysis would be uh driven to racial proportionality uh under um the respondents approach. Um now I understand the uh concerns about that when you're talking about uh districting, but why is that why is that a bad thing when you're talking about electoral procedures?
Well what it means is that any neutral system must be changed in order to maximize minority voting strength, regardless of how strong the justification is. Things that provide no unfairness at all to minorities, uh you must re-jigger every aspect of the time, place, and manner from registration to election day to early voting in order to maximize uh minorities' participation. Why is that bad? Because it's the same kind of race conscious activity of subordinating. Well is it is it really
is it maximizing participation or or equalizing it? In other words, uh th that only comes up when you have disparate results.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the core dispute over Arizona’s voting practices in the Brnovich case?
0:00–13:50
2
How does the State argue that time, place, and manner rules are facially neutral?
13:50–26:46
3
What is the “usual burdens of voting” test and why does it matter here?
26:46–40:14
4
How do the parties use hypothetical polling‑place scenarios to illustrate disparate impact?
40:14–53:57
5
Why does Justice Alito focus on the size of the statistical disparity?
53:57–1:10:31
6
What evidence is presented about ballot‑collection practices and minority voters?
1:10:31–1:25:02
7
How do the parties address the issue of legislative intent and standing?
1:25:02–1:39:39
8
What is the final “totality‑of‑circumstances” test proposed by the State?
1:39:39–1:54:12