Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA (23-713)
argument 23-713Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 12m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What is the central dispute in Bufkin v. McDonough before the Supreme Court?
We'll hear argument first this morning, case twenty three, seven, thirteen, Buffkin versus McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Ms. Bostwick?
Mr.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In Gilbert, one of its earliest decisions, the newly created Veterans Court recognized both the importance of the benefit of the doubt principle. And the difference between reviewing findings of fact for clear error and reviewing VA's application of the approximate balance standard of proof as a matter of law. But the Veterans Court soon strayed from that understanding. And by 2001, the Court had declared that the agency's approximate balance assessment can be reviewed only under the Deferential Clear Error Standard of 7261. Congress responded by changing the statute. It directed the Veterans Court to take due account of the Secretary's application of Section fifty one oh seven B, the Benefit of the Doubt statute, and that new statutory command, unique in administrative review,
Directed to a specialized Article I Tribunal reviewing a uniquely proclaimant agency process must be given effect. Petitioners have provided an account of Section 7261 B one's plain text that gives effect to all parts of the statute and allows for the meaningful and independent judicial scrutiny that Congress intended. Yet the government insists that the statute not only requires nothing that wasn't already required by Section A before two thousand two. But also requires the one thing we know Congress didn't want. Under its view, the veterans court does not even look at the agency's benefit of the doubt rulings unless a sp so long as no factual finding specifically challenged by the veteran is infected with clear error.
That is also what the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit held in these cases. Their decisions render Congress's statutory amendment entirely superfluous. They mean that a uniquely generous standard of proof is reviewed in a uniquely ungenerous way, and if upheld, they will allow the agency's noncompliance with its statutory mandate to continue unchecked. I welcome the Court's questions.
Um would you spend uh a minute or so explaining how your approach would work in comparison to the government's approach?
Certainly, Your Honor. So our view of the statute it starts with the text. So the text is in making the determinations under subsection A, what are the determinations that the Veterans Court makes under Subsection A? It is looking at the particular aspects of the agency's order that are challenged on appeal. So deciding whether to affirm, reverse, or vacate those decisions. That's the determinations under subsection A. In making those determinations, uh just like the veterans court, if it's otherwise inclined to reverse or vacate, under B two, it has to do a a a check to make sure that the any error was in fact prejudicial. Under B1, if it's otherwise inclined to affirm, it nonetheless has to do a a check and make sure that the decisions that it is about to affirm complied with the uh with section 5107 B.
That is the benefit of the Doubt statute. And the benefit of the Doubt statute in turn has two mandatory requirements. It requires the VA to consider all medical and lay evidence and information relevant to the c the issue and then it requires if there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence on any issue that the veteran receives the benefit of the doubt. So our view is go
ahead.
Y thank you, Your Honor. Uh our view is that that this is something the Veterans Court has to do in every case, that it is not bound by party presentation, and that it is a non deferential review.
But it's a pretty unusual uh law, right? It says that the administration shall take account of, take due account of. It doesn't seem that they're changing the legal standard at all. It just says sort of be more careful. Um and to take from that instruction some change uh in the legal standard of review I think is is quite a leap.
So we don't think that it was was changing what the standard of review should have been.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central dispute in Bufkin v. McDonough before the Supreme Court?
0:00–11:00
2
How did the early Veterans Court decisions shape the benefit‑of‑the‑doubt principle?
11:00–19:57
3
Why did Congress amend § 7261 B in 2002 and what does the new language require?
19:57–29:00
4
What is petitioners’ argument that B‑1 should be reviewed de novo rather than under clear‑error?
29:00–36:32
5
How does the government defend the clear‑error standard for factual findings?
36:32–45:57
6
What does the two‑expert hypothetical illustrate about the approximate‑balance standard?
45:57–54:56
7
Is the “approximate balance” determination a mixed question of law and fact?
54:56–1:03:59
8
What are the parties’ final requests and how might the Court’s decision affect future veterans’ claims?
1:03:59–1:12:43