California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc. (16-373)
argument 16-373California Public Employees' Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the court’s argument that American Pipe tolling applies to the one‑year filing period in Section 13?
Your argument this afternoon in Case 16-373, the California Public Employees Retirement System v. ANZ Securities. Mr. Goldstein?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, we ask you to hold that American pipe tolling applies to both of the time limits set forth in Section 13 of the Securities Act, which is reproduced in a number of places, including the blue brief at the top of page 3. The other side has a tendency to invoke the phrase statute of repose, which isn't really self-defining in the phrase, in no event, when there's more going on in the statute than that. So I thought I would just start with the text. And it begins, no action, and action is going to be the important noun here, no action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under Section 11 unless brought, and that's going to be the operative thing that has to happen
Within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, the three-year period will follow in the next sentence, but we can pause here for just a second because it teaches a lot. We know that American pipe tolling applies to this sentence, and therefore we know a few things, and it's conceded and everyone agrees. The action is brought on... Just a little fast for me. I apologize. We know American pipe applies. To this sentence, that is, if you file your action within one year and class certification is denied, say, at year two, so we haven't gotten to three years yet, if class certification is denied two years afterwards, then American Pipe tolling applies and a class member can opt out.
I apologize for moving through that so quickly. I understand. And so what we know from that, I think, is as American Pipe tells us, that the class action complaint commences the action on behalf of each unnamed class member, and in the wording of Section 13, it brings the action on behalf of every unnamed class member. So the class complaint in our case, which was filed within a year, brought the action on our behalf. Now, the second sentence says, and it's the one that issued in the case before you, In no event shall any such action, referring to the one in the previous sentence, be brought to enforce a liability created under Section 11 more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public.
And so what happens, we believe, is that just as the action was brought by the class action complaint within one year, it was also brought, within necessarily three years. It was brought, and it was brought on our behalf. And we don't think that there's anything in this sentence that is concerned with the application of something like American pipe tolling, which is an interpretation of Rule 23. If it doesn't apply here, we think, then Rule 23 doesn't work, and it's going to generate all manner of satellite litigation over what is a statute of repose and what isn't. And it will all be entirely pointless. The
argument that you're making is the one that you describe, I think. Or am I correct? It's the one you... say on page 38 of your brief, is the easiest way to decide this case?
No, sir. This is the straightforward argument. The
statute of repose argument.
This is why I don't mean to confuse you. The argument
relating to the statute of repose.
It has nothing to do with whether the class action was still pending at the time, which is the debate over what the scope of the second question presented is. This is the argument that was presented straightforwardly in IndyMac, and it is simply the fact that under the text of Section 13, the class action complaint brought the action on our behalf. And the point that I was making is that as I understand the other side's rule, it amounts to a huge amount of just pointless paperwork. Because the other side understands how this statute should operate, and that is when the class action complaint is filed, then what should happen is every class member ought to move to intervene in the action or file their own individual complaint then to presage the possibility that hypothetically someday later they might opt out and litigate on their behalf.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the court’s argument that American Pipe tolling applies to the one‑year filing period in Section 13?
0:00–8:08
2
How does the plaintiff distinguish the two‑tiered time limits as a statute of repose versus a statute of limitations?
8:08–15:02
3
Why does the respondent claim that the second sentence of Section 13 creates a statute of repose that cannot be tolled?
15:02–21:29
4
What role do class‑action complaints play in bringing the “action” on behalf of unnamed class members?
21:29–28:26
5
How do venue‑transfer rules and automatic tolling affect the three‑year limitation period?
28:26–36:08
6
What are the policy consequences of allowing individual interventions or separate lawsuits after class certification is denied?
36:08–43:07
7
How does the Court’s interpretation of “action” under Rule 23 impact the opt‑out right and the statute of repose?
43:07–51:28
8
What is the final holding on whether Section 13 is a statute of repose and whether American Pipe tolling can override it?
51:28–58:26