Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez (14-857)

argument 14-857

Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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Does an offer of complete relief automatically moot a plaintiff’s claim?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 14-857, Campbell Ewald Company v. Gomez. Mr. Garr.

Unknown 0:10

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. To affirm the Ninth Circuit on the first two questions presented, this Court must accept the following two propositions. First, a plaintiff can force a Court to adjudicate the merits of his claim simply by refusing the defendant's offer of capitulation and complete relief. And second — that a plaintiff has what amounts to a substantive right to class litigation that applies as soon as a complaint is filed and that entitles the case to proceed even if his individual claim drops out before any... Is there any controversy over whether the offer is complete relief? I don't think so, Your Honor. The District Court found that it was at page 40 of the petition appendix.

Unknown 0:53

The Ninth Circuit decided this case based on that premise. That's at page 5A of the petition appendix. So I think Did we take it on that assumption, too? I think you should, Your Honor. Now, they have argued below that the only reason that it wasn't for complete relief was because it didn't provide for attorney's fees. But the TCPA, the underlying statute here, does not provide for attorney's fees.

Anthony M. Kennedy 1:15

But that's a merits question as to whether they're entitled to attorney's fees. If the question is complete relief means what the plaintiff has asked for, the plaintiff has asked for attorney's fees here.

Unknown 1:27

I don't think that's what complete relief means, Your Honor. I think it means that the plaintiff has received everything that he could if he received a judgment. Well,

Elena Kagan 1:36

he would receive a finding of liability, which you didn't admit in your offer. He would be entitled to an injunction against that activity, the activity that caused this particular situation. And if others were shown to an injunction — in other ways. So I don't see how this could be — putting aside the class action, putting aside the attorney's fees, those appear to be — to be fairly critical liability determinations that were not made by the Court below.

Unknown 2:12

MR. Okay. First, as the case comes to the Court, I think it is accepted that the offer was for complete relief. Now, let me try to answer the points that you raise. First, he's not entitled to a finding of liability. A litigant was always entitled to a finding of liability. then essentially no case could become moot. If you take the voluntary cessation context, litigant could always insist that he's still entitled to the finding of libel. It seems to be honest to write an opinion saying that a settlement offer is equivalent to a judgment. And we've had cases like the Kekkonen case in which there was a settlement approved by the court, case dismissed. Then the settlement was not performed. They went to court seeking injunction.

Unknown 2:52

The court said, no, no, you have a contract. You have to file again. You have to go into a different court. You have to start all over again. A settlement offer. offer in a settlement contract and a settlement agreement are different from a judgment, and you do not have a judgment. Well, Your Honor, I think that the accepted principle is that a settlement moots the case and requires the court to dispose of the case. I mean, I think that's the accepted principle. But you didn't pursue that. You didn't apply the rules for a judgment. And if you want us to write an opinion and say, oh, well, a settlement offers the same as a judgment, that just doesn't accord with federal rules of civil procedure or with our cases like the Kokonin case.

Unknown 3:32

Well, Your Honor, I think this case is consistent with the Kokonin case. What the Kokonin case recognizes is that once a case has come to an end, the court has ancillary jurisdiction to dispose of it. In that case, it dealt with the enforcement of a consent decree. But the federal rule in point, Mr. Garr, and it says — Rule 68 says an offer of judgment expires automatically after 14 days if it's not accepted. It is deemed withdrawn, and it cannot be used for any purpose other than to saddle the plaintiff with costs if she doesn't get more than the offer.