Carson v. Makin (20-1088)
argument 20-1088Carson v. Makin
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 55m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What constitutional issue does Maine’s sectarian school exclusion raise?
We will hear argument first this morning in case twenty ten eighty eight, Carson versus Macon. Mr Bindis?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Maine's sectarian exclusion discriminates based on religion. Like all discrimination based on religion, it should be subjected to strict scrutiny and held unconstitutional unless Maine can show that it is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. Maine cannot make such a showing, and the First Circuit never held that it could. Instead, the First Circuit held that there are two kinds of religious discrimination. the bad kind and the good kind. The First Circuit recognized that Maine cannot discriminate against students or schools because they are religious, but it held the state is perfectly free to discriminate against students or schools because they do religious things, such as teach or receive instruction in religion.
The first circuit was wrong. Religious discrimination is religious discrimination, and unless it can survive strict scrutiny, it is unconstitutional. The First Circuit's refusal to apply strict scrutiny based on a supposed status use distinction was baseless. There is no basis for a use based departure from strict scrutiny in the text of the Free Exercise Clause. There's no basis for it in this court's free exercise precedent. And there is no basis for it in common sense. Religious schools, after all, teach religion. Just as a soccer team plays soccer or a book club reads books. Yes, it is part of what they do. It is also part of who they are. Of course, religious schools also teach secular subjects. and satisfy every secular requirement to participate in the tuition assistance programme.
It is only because of religion that they are excluded. You can call that discrimination based on religious use. You can call it discrimination based on religious status. Call it what you will. Either way it is discrimination based on religion and either way it is unconstitutional. I welcome the Court's questions.
The uh neither of the two schools that you um talk about, discuss, uh has indicated that it it will accept students who receive state funding or subsidies. Uh would you discuss just briefly then s your uh whether or not you have standing.
Absolutely, Your Honor. The first circuit correctly held that whether or not these two particular schools ultimately will or will not participate was beside the point, because the constitutional injury here is the denial of the opportunity to even seek out religious education under this program. That constitutional injury is directly attributable to the sectarian exclusion, and it is unquestionable that holding the sectarian exclusion unconstitutional would redress that injury. And this Court's decisions in cases such as Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors, Heckler Mat versus Matthews, make clear that when a plaintiff is challenging the a barrier, a discriminatory barrier to a public benefit, the plaintiff need not show, indeed, need not even allege that they would actually obtain the benefit but for the discriminatory provision.
In fact, in Heckler versus Matthews, it was a foregone conclusion that if the plaintiff was successful in challenging the discriminatory provision in the public benefit program, he would not get the benefit because there was a unique Yeah. in the program that said, if this provision is invalidated, the benefit goes away. It doesn't get extended to the excluded class, it goes away. This court held that nevertheless, even though it was a foregone conclusion the plaintiff would not get the benefit, he nevertheless had ch uh standing this challenge. Does that mean that if there were only two schools in the State that met the uh petitioners' religious requirements, so only two schools that the petitioners would go to.
um would use this money for. Uh and both of and we knew that both of those schools were not going to accept the money or were very unlikely to accept the money. Still we would say that there was standard.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What constitutional issue does Maine’s sectarian school exclusion raise?
0:00–13:30
2
How does the argument about strict scrutiny apply to Maine’s tuition program?
13:30–26:44
3
Why do the petitioners claim they have standing despite no school willing to accept the funds?
26:44–39:14
4
What distinction does the Court draw between the Locke decision and this case?
39:14–54:46
5
How would a school that teaches a religion through the lens of faith be evaluated for eligibility?
54:46–1:10:24
6
What potential religious strife does the government fear if religious schools receive funding?
1:10:24–1:27:00
7
How does the “play in the joints” doctrine affect state discretion over school‑choice programs?
1:27:00–1:41:38
8
What is the final request of the petitioners and how do they propose the Court rule?
1:41:38–1:55:00