Case v. Montana (24-624)

argument 24-624

Case v. Montana

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 15m 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 1 month ago official recording ↗

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What is the constitutional basis for the Fourth Amendment’s protection against warrantless home entries?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument next in Case 24624, Case v. Montana. Mr. Rowley.

Mr. Rowley 0:06

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. This Court has never allowed State officials to force their way into someone's home without a warrant or probable cause. It should not start now. There is no liberty interest more deeply rooted in the Fourth Amendment than the sanctity of the home. The Court has long recognized that physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. And the facts here well illustrate what's at stake with such entries. The police entered Trevor Case's home without permission, a warrant, or even probable cause, and they ended up shooting him in his own house. Montana seeks to justify this intrusion under the emergency aid exception, which permits a home entry only when an officer has an objectively reasonable basis for believing that

Mr. Rowley 0:58

that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. As Montana previously acknowledged, that standard, quote, requires, in function if not in form, that officers have probable cause to believe someone's in danger and requires immediate assistance, close quote. Now Montana insists probable cause is not the right standard, but it also doesn't defend the reasonable suspicion standard applied by the Montana Supreme Court Below, instead, Montana and the United States asked the Court to adopt some other threshold that would permit officials, for the first time, to breach the sanctity of the home when they don't have permission, don't have a warrant, and don't even have facts leading to a fair probability that an emergency is actually taking place within the home.

Mr. Rowley 1:50

Their proposed reasonableness standard is so vague that not even the State and its amici can agree on what it means. And its open-ended balancing approach invites abuse and confusion, leaving police and first responders without the guidance they need and citizens without the security promised by the Fourth Amendment. The Court should adhere to the textual and traditional standard of probable cause. I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:16

Do we normally use probable cause standard outside of the criminal context?

Mr. Rowley 2:21

Your Honor, the Court has applied probable cause in camera, for example. with respect to administrative warrants. And in other contexts as well, I would point to, for example, Wren, where the Court applied it to civil vehicle infractions. And so the Court has applied it in non-criminal contexts.

Clarence Thomas 2:42

Would you — what is the objectively reasonable basis standard?

Mr. Rowley 2:49

Your Honor, I think the objectively reasonable basis standard applied in Brigham City is calls for and really contemplates, sort of lends itself to some standard of certainty. And our position is that that standard of certainty is probable cause, the traditional standard that the Court has applied. Yes, Your Honor.

Clarence Thomas 3:06

Well, I mean, I'm just asking what it means. Is there any difference between that and probable cause?

Mr. Rowley 3:12

Your Honor, we think that the standard sounds in probable cause. The Court didn't use those words in Brigham City, and it did not use those words in Fisher. But we do think that the standard echoes probable cause. I'd point, for example, to the language in Pringle where the Court said that the substance of all probable cause definitions is reasonable belief of guilt. And so while the Court didn't use the word probable cause, we do think that there is an echo between the standard applied in Brigham City and the probable cause standard.

John G. Roberts 3:45

Well, I was just going to say, when we talk about probable cause, we use it as a shorthand. It's probable cause of what?

Mr. Rowley 3:53

So, Mr. Chief Justice, here it would be probable cause that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. Ordinarily, it would be probable cause to think a crime is being committed. But here, as the government explained in its brief in Brigham City, the object might change. But the way that the standard applies and the level of certainty does not.