CFPB v. Com. Fin. Services Assn. (22-448)
argument 22-448CFPB v. Com. Fin. Services Assn.
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 34m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the constitutional issue the Court is addressing in CFPB v. Community Financial Services?
We will hear an argument this morning in case twenty two four four four four four four four four four four four four four four four four four eight, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Bureau versus the Community Financial Services Association. General Prelogger.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Fifth Circuit's decision in this case is the first time any court in our nation's history has held that Congress violated the Appropriations Clause by enacting a statute providing funding. This court should uphold the CFPB's funding statute because it is firmly grounded in constitutional text and in historical practice dating back to the founding. The text of the constitution shows that when the framers wanted to limit Congress's appropriations authority, they did so expressly. And while the framers restricted appropriations for the Army to two years, they applied no similar limits on appropriations for any other agency. History confirms that point.
Since the founding, Congress has consistently funded agencies through standing appropriations that are not time limited and that provide significant discretion over how much to spend. The first Congress did exactly this with the very first agency it created, the Customs Service, and the same is true for other founding era agencies, including the Post Office, the National Mint, the Patent Office, Revenue Officers, and the National Bank. And Congress has used this kind of appropriation as the default when funding financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
The CFPB's appropriation fits squarely within this unbroken line of historical practice. In fact, Congress exercised significantly more discretion and control over the Bureau's funding by capping its annual appropriation in an amount that is far lower than many other agencies' budgets. Respondents argue that the combination of features in the CFPB statute violates some previously unrecognized constitutional line. But the Bureau's appropriation is materially identical to the numerous funding statutes I just listed, and respondents concede those statutes are constitutional. This court should reject respondents' attempt to gerrymander a rule to fit the CFPB alone without providing a coherent theory about how to interpret and apply the appropriations clause.
I welcome the court's questions.
Uh General, uh other than um passing an appropriations law. Are there any limits on what Congress can do?
So I I think at the outset, as your question touches on Justice Thomas, the term appropriation itself contains some essential requirements. So that term is defined to mean a law that provides for funding and that specifies both the source and the purpose of the funding. That's how an appropriation was defined at the founding. It's how it's always been understood, and that's still how it's defined today in sources like the GAO Red Book, which is Congress's own appropriations treatise. So we think that at the outset it's not just any old law, but a law that contains those features that constitutes an appropriation. And then I think the question becomes: are there other limits out there on how Congress can structure funding for particular type of activities or government functions?
We know obviously from the Army Appropriations Clause that the answer is yes with respect to that particular government function. There's a durational limit, and it's based on the nature of the activity. because the framers were specifically concerned about having a standing army. But I think the Army Appropriations Clause itself demonstrates that there are not otherwise constraints in the appropriations clause that would limit Congress and how it decides to structure the funding.
So beyond the the uh initial s almost skeletal uh requirements of duration and purpose, there isn't uh in uh I'm hear as if I hear you right, there is no other condition.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the constitutional issue the Court is addressing in CFPB v. Community Financial Services?
0:00–14:16
2
How does the Solicitor General argue that the CFPB’s funding statute fits historical appropriations practice?
14:16–26:30
3
What concerns do the Justices raise about the duration and scope of standing appropriations?
26:30–38:10
4
How do the parties use the Customs Service and other early agencies as precedent for the CFPB’s funding?
38:10–49:22
5
Why do the respondents claim that the CFPB’s cap and delegation exceed the Appropriations Clause?
49:22–1:00:09
6
What arguments are made about the separation‑of‑powers implications of letting an agency set its own budget?
1:00:09–1:12:27
7
How do the Justices explore possible remedies—retrospective versus prospective—and their impact on the agency?
1:12:27–1:22:55
8
What is the final position of the Solicitor General on why the CFPB’s funding is constitutionally permissible?
1:22:55–1:34:16