Chaidez v. United States (11-820)

argument 11-820

Chaidez v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 1m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central issue the Court is addressing in Chaidez v. United States?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument first this morning in case eleven eight twenty, Roselva Chidez versus United States. Mr Fisher.

Fisher 0:09

Mr Chief Justice, it may I please the court. In the more than twenty years since this court decided Teague against Lane, it has had more than a dozen cases in which people have sought habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. This Court has never once held that applying Strickland in those divergent factual settings constituted a new rule. For two reasons this court should reject the government's argument to do so for the first time here. First, Padilla was dictated by precedent. That is, like other Strickland cases that came before it, this court in Padilla simply applied Strickland's formula of assessing attorney performance according to prevailing professional norms to a new set of facts.

John G. Roberts 0:47

It's a surprise to the what, ten courts of appeals who came out the other way?

Fisher 0:52

Uh no I don't think so, uh Your Honor. Two two things about the lower courts. Uh the first is there are only three lower court decisions that postdate the nineteen ninety six Act. that the government can cite that came out the other way in terms of the question presented here. Uh and the second thing is even within those cases and within those courts they didn't distinguish between deportation advice and other kinds of advice. They distinguished between acts and omissions. That is to say, it was a uniform rule in the lower courts at the time this court decided Padia that misadvice concerning the right to de I'm sorry, concerning deportation consequences of a plea did violate stricklet. So the distinction in lower courts was not between deportation advice and other kinds of advice.

Fisher 1:36

The distinction was between acts and omissions. So

John G. Roberts 1:41

maybe it was a surprise to the members of this court that disagreed with that.

Fisher 1:45

No,

John G. Roberts 1:46

uh with the ruling in Padilla.

Fisher 1:48

Well, obviously there was a dissent in Padilla, uh but this court has held before that new applications of Strickland did not constitute a new rule, even though there were dissents.

How does the Court apply the Strickland standard to deportation‑consequence advice?

Fisher 1:57

It's a Williams.

Ginsburg 1:58

What about the argument that Strickland doesn't come into play unless the Sixth Amendment includes the collateral consequences in in counsel's obligation to defend a defendant in in a criminal case. The argument is that up to up to Padilla, only advice relevant to guilt or innocence and sentencing was required, not collateral consequences.

Fisher 2:29

Well that was obviously the argument that the state of Kentucky made in that case, and this court dealt with it in part two of Padilla. Now remember, Justice Ginsburg, the Court did not extend Strickland to collateral consequences in Padilla. It actually reserved that question. What it held is that deportation consequences are not removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment. So remember

Ginsburg 2:49

So it's also a a question if if conviction meant loss of a professional license, that would be an open question.

Fisher 2:58

I think that's an open question after Padilla. What this court held in Padilla, and this is the second to last sentence in part two, is that Advice concerning deportation consequences of guilty plea are not categorically removed from the Sixth Amendment. So what I understood the court to do in PADIA was take the ordinary Strickland formula of prevailing professional norms and simply apply it to this criminal case. Remember PADIA itself is a criminal case.

Unknown 3:22

I mean we we never come out with a decision that doesn't rely upon some pre existing principle. We always cite some pre existing principle. Does that mean that every case of ours i is is is not new law?

Fisher 3:37

Of course not. The question this court asks under Teague is whether it broke new ground. And I think what this court said in Padilla is we reject the artificial restriction on Strickland that the lower courts have created. So therefore, this court simply reaffirms Strickland. Well, Mr.

Anthony M. Kennedy 3:52

Fisher, th think about this in an EDPA context. I mean, assume that you have these ten circuit courts all um going in the way that the Chief Justice said. And then one court came along and said, you know, we think that they i in an EDPA context, uh habeas