Chase Bank USA, N. A. v. McCoy (09-329)

argument 09-329

Chase Bank USA, N. A. v. McCoy

Supreme Court of the United States 57 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal question in Chase Bank v. McCoy?

John G. Roberts 0:02

We'll hear argument first this morning in case zero nine three two two two two two two two two two two nine, Chase Bank versus McCoy. Mr. Waxman?

Ted Waxman 0:08

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The question presented is how to interpret a since amended version of Regulation Z. in amicus briefs filed solicited by the First Circuit and by this court. The Federal Reserve Board has confirmed That it has long interpreted its regulation just as Chase Bank and the rest of the regulated credit card industry understood.

Anthony M. Kennedy 0:35

Mr. Waxman, can can I ask you about the deference that we should give to the briefs that have been filed in the First Circuit and the invitation brief in this case. Um our deference seems pretty for square with this. It's a brief that was filed to interpret an agency regulation. But I'm wondering whether our continues to remain good law. after Christiansen and Mead. In Christensen the court held and I quote interpretations such as those in opinion letters Like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law. Do not warrant chevron style deference. And Mead said pretty much the same things. So it seems to me that there are three possibilities for why hour remains.

Anthony M. Kennedy 1:28

One is that briefs are somehow different from all those other things that we talked about in Christensen. Another is that an agency gets more deference when interpreting regulations than when interpreting its own statutes. Something that I think uh I just don't quite understand, but maybe you could convince me of it. And a third is well look, they're just basically inconsistent, but our was our and we don't feel like overruling cases and we're not so sure we got it right in in um Christensen and Mead anyway. So which is it?

Ted Waxman 2:02

A lot of the above. Um first of all, our has been applied in the context of amicus briefs since Christensen and Mead both unanimously, both in Kennedy and in Long Island care at home. And I must say, in both of those cases, the deference was to a brief that acknowledged a change in the agency's position, which is quite unlike what is going on here.

Anthony M. Kennedy 2:27

Absolutely right, Mr. Waxman. But in each of those cases it was basically a sentence or two. We never really addressed the possible conflict between our and Christensen and Meade.

Ted Waxman 2:37

Nonetheless, um I think those cases stand for the proposition that our is alive and well, and in any event, as your question pointed out, both Meade and Christensen and the passage in Christensen that you're referring to dealt with the question of chevron deference to informal letters from the so from you know a somebody who was employed by an administrative agency and the question in the case the interpretive question in the case in the Chevron context is What confidence can we have that Congress has in fact delegated to the agency interpretive or rule making authority in this context. So, for example, in mead the Court distinguished between notice and comment regulations that custom put out as opposed to the kind of determinations that were made by forty six different offices at the rate of something like fifteen thousand letters a year.

Ted Waxman 3:34

In the when Christiansen dealt with the our question because it did involve an an informal opinion of the wage an hour administrator both interpreting the Fair Labour Standards Act and a regulation. When it came to interpreting the regulation, what this court said is Our deference doesn't apply here because we read the regulation as clear. And our of course made clear that deference is due to an agency brief uh unless it is Um plainly erroneous or the regulation is clear. Now here we have a situation in which it is not an agency Oh I staff or whatever that is applied, the first circuit asked the government for the f solicited the Federal Reserve Board itself. to explain the meaning of its own regulation. And the brief that was filed represented that it was the longstanding and consistent interpretation of the Federal Reserve Board.

Elena Kagan 4:39

Mr. Waxman, I take it from this whole discussion that