Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon (23-50)

argument 23-50

Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon

Supreme Court of the United States 58 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 9 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the charge‑specific rule for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case twenty three fifty, Sheverini versus the City of Napoleon. Ms. Anand?

Unknown 0:07

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Everyone in this case now agrees that as the lack of probable cause element of a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, the charge specific rule governs. That is, a plaintiff may make out a malicious prosecution claim by proving that one charge is not supported by probable cause, even if other charges are, provided, of course, that the plaintiff also makes out the other elements of the claim. As no one appears to dispute, that charge specific rule is supported, as Chief Judge Pryor put the point, by both centuries of common law and by bedrock Fourth Amendment principles. That's all this court needs to address to resolve this case. Respondents urged this court to go beyond that ruling to weigh in on a series of open questions about a different element of the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim that resulted in a seizure element.

Unknown 1:00

No one disputes, Mr. Cheverini is going to have to prove that on remand. But weighing in on the kind of precise contours of that question would require this court to go beyond the question presented to address issues not aired at all below that haven't percolated in the courts of appeal. appeal and to do so on the sort of briefing that doesn't have the kinds of text, history, common law arguments that you would expect before weighing in on an element of a constitutional tort. As in Thompson, this case involves a narrow dispute over one element of a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim. This court should simply hold that a plaintiff can make out a claim by showing that at least one charge lacks probable cause, again assuming they can make out the other elements of the claim, and remand for consideration of everything else.

Unknown 1:43

I welcome this court's questions.

John G. Roberts 1:45

Well what do you have to show, if anything, about causation? If you have a situation where y you've got three cri uh uh three allegations and two uh are concededly valid and they justify the uh seizure, uh you still get relief? Don't you have to s show some kind of causation?

Unknown 2:04

Yes, Your Honor. So we agree there has to be some kind of causation, and we think the formulation in Thompson is correct. You have to show that the malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure. Our position is that if you want to weigh in on precisely what the counterfactual is, the eleventh circuit's position is correct. That the correct counterfactual is could this have been done as a warrantless arrest. The eleventh circuit's What's

Elena Kagan 2:25

it?

Unknown 2:25

Uh sh could the uh plaintiff have been seized for this length of time or r or seized for this length of time based on a warrantless arrest? And so the way Tom the way the Eleventh Circuit articulates it is look, this legal process was corrupted. We know this legal process was necessary if the detention is longer than forty-eight hours, right? That's a fourth amendment requirement. You've got to have legal process for a detention that's longer than forty-eight hours. And so because this legal process was necessary. What you have to show is uh you prevail unless this could have been done as a warrantless arrest.

John G. Roberts 2:56

Well I thought uh the the evidence was that um uh the the first two uh of the crimes would certainly support uh what was done in this case without regard to the third.

Unknown 3:09

So that's correct, Your Honor. Would support in the sense that a magistrate could constitutionally have signed this arrest warrant. But in fact, no magistrate did sign this arrest warrant based on just those two charges. So based on this kind of court's case law, so for instance, we cite the Eastern District of Michigan case in our opening brief, where the court says that's the case, remember, where the attorney general says I can sign warrants to authorize why. Taps, this court says, surely a magistrate would have signed off on these warrants, right? Surely a magistrate would have uh caved the national security concerns and signed these things.