Ciminelli v. United State (21-1170)
argument 21-1170Ciminelli v. United State
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 17m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the “right‑to‑control” doctrine and why is it central to the Ciminelli case?
We'll hear argument next in case twenty one eleven seventy, Simonelli versus United States. Mr Drievan.
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. For decades the Second Circuit has applied an invalid theory wire fraud called the right to control doctrine. The government now agrees. It concedes that the right to control doctrine could lead to overbroad results that would expand property fraud beyond the definition of common law and as Congress would have understood it. Instead, the government offers a new and even broader theory of fraud. fraudulent inducement of a transaction. Yet in the one hundred and fifty years since the mail fraud statute was enacted, No case of this court has embraced that theory. This court should not do so now. First The court should not entertain the theory at all.
The theory was not the basis for the jury verdict. This Court has held that it can quote not affirm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury. Second, the government not only forfeited but intentionally abandoned a fraud theory, treating the contract funds as property. The government superseded the indictment to drop that theory. It proceeded solely on the right to control. and it used that theory to exclude critical defence evidence. Third, the new theory is wrong. The theory dispenses with a quintessential requirement of common law fraud. harm to a traditional property interest if the scheme succeeds. It would radically expand federal law. violate federalism principles and end run limits on honest services fraud.
And the theory's breadth requires ad hoc patches that contradict black letter law and that even the government does not fully endorse. Instead of wading into those issues, the courts should resolve the question presented, reject the right to control theory and reverse. And because the government has offered no other theory of property fraud below The Court should direct entry of an acquittal. I welcome the Court's questions. To begin with the right to control theory which is the question presented. The Second Circuit crafted that theory based on non traditional ideas drawn from a set of cases that did not examine fundamental questions of what property means under the property fraud statutes. Those statutes incorporate the common law, as this Court has repeatedly held.
So Mr. Drievan, I mean, uh let's say that you win this case because the government um presented the right to control as a property interest and now is not even defending that. All right. So I I just want to So let's let's let's say you win. Um But but you're saying that the government doesn't even have it right now. And I guess I wonder why that's the case. Um Uh You know, a billion dollars is a lot of property. And uh if you take what the government is now saying uh uh you know, frame it as this was an effort to obtain money, the most classic form of property. um through a fraudulent scheme. So why couldn't I know it didn't, but why couldn't the government have framed its case in that way?
So Justice Kagan, the fundamental reason why that cannot be a valid basis for property fraud is it was not the meaning of common law fraud at the time that Congress enacted the mail fraud statute and that assimilated those common law concepts. Fraud requires harm to a traditional property interest. It is usually in government prosecuted cases pecuniary harm. For This could be an overcharging case. It wasn't, but if the government wanted to prosecute pecuniary fraud as an overcharging case, that fits within common law fraud. It also fits within common law fraud if the victim is deprived of another. So
if if I if I understand you correctly, you are saying that in addition Um y the government has to prove, in addition to proving that there was um uh a scheme to obtain property, a scheme to obtain money. The government also has to prove that on the other side there was economic loss. And I guess that strikes me as um just a different issue, an orthogonal issue from the one that really has been raised in this case, which is um
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the “right‑to‑control” doctrine and why is it central to the Ciminelli case?
0:01–7:41
2
How does the government’s new “fraudulent inducement” theory differ from the traditional property‑fraud approach?
7:41–17:35
3
Why does the petitioner argue that the government’s theory was abandoned and should be considered a waiver?
17:35–26:53
4
What role do the jury instructions and the indictment play in determining whether the conviction is valid?
26:53–38:20
5
How do the Supreme Court’s precedents on mail and wire fraud (e.g., McNally, Ciarrella) affect this case?
38:20–48:44
6
Is the alleged $750 million contract fund a “property interest” under the statute?
48:44–58:51
7
What would be the legal consequences if the Court finds the right‑to‑control theory invalid?
58:51–1:08:29
8
Should the Court reverse the conviction, remand for a new trial, or enter an acquittal?
1:08:29–1:17:44