City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan (13-1412)
argument 13-1412City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central legal question about the ADA’s application to arrests of armed and violent suspects?
Her argument next this morning, Case 13-14-12, the City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan. Ms. Van Aken.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court.
Ms. Van Aken, before you go any further.
Yes, Justice Scalia.
Your petition for writ of certiorari, and it was a petition that had your name on it, said on the reasons for granting the petitions This Court should resolve whether and how the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to arrests of armed and violent suspects who are disabled. The circuits are in conflict on this question. The question presented is recurring and important, and Title II of the ADA does not require accommodations for armed and violent suspects who are disabled. And that's the issue on which there is a circuit conflict. I now look at the table of contents of your petition. This argument is not made in the petition at all. You concede that Title II does apply even to the arrest of armed and dangerous suspects.
You just say, in this case, modification to Sheehan's arrest would not have eliminated the significant risk she posed. There's a technical word for this. It's called bait and switch. We might well not have granted this petition had you not listed those reasons. Are we supposed to appoint somebody else to argue the point that you asked us to resolve in your petition for certiorari?
With respect, Justice Scalia, San Francisco asked you to resolve the question of whether and how the ADA applies to the arrest of an armed and violent individual. And the answer to that question is it only applies — where the significant threat that the individual poses has been eliminated.
That's not what your petition said. Title II does not require accommodations for armed and violent suspects who are disabled, period, is what it says. And that is not the argument you make in your principal brief.
Well, with respect, Justice Scalia, page 3 of our reply in support of certiorari, so still at the certiorari stage, says that the issue here is not a fact-intensive reasonableness question, but instead it's whether an armed and violent individual's accommodation is required. And the answer to that is no, where the significant risk hasn't been eliminated. And our arguments at the certiorari stage certainly didn't turn on any claim that the ADA — I'm
sorry. I looked at your papers below. And there was an argument as to whether the ADA applied at all to arrest. And nowhere do you raise the direct threat argument. Nowhere do you raise below the risk argument. It was a pure legal question, the one I thought we were going to answer. But on appeal, you're now using the words direct threat and risk. What are we supposed to do with this argument? We're supposed to change the nature of the case and perhaps reverse the Ninth Circuit on an argument that was never presented to it?
I disagree, Your Honor. In the Ninth Circuit, San Francisco argued that the Ninth Circuit should adopt essentially the Fifth Circuit's rule, that where there are exigent circumstances in that there is no requirement of accommodation. There was no argument that the ADA just has nothing to do with arrests. It's that in exigent arrests, like the Fifth Circuit said in Heinze, then you don't, there's not a reasonable accommodation. No accommodation is reasonable. So in a sense, the ADA doesn't apply. But that's because of the exigency, as the Fifth Circuit said in Heinze. And that was the conflict that we asked this Court to take the case to resolve.
Before we get to the question that you have briefed and the question that the Solicitor General has briefed, there is another question that logically comes first. The statute, 42 U.S.C. 12132, says no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. That's the relevant statutory
provision,
isn't it? All right. So all we have there is discrimination. Is there any provision of the ADA that defines what is meant by discrimination in that context, not in the employment context,
in
that context?
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal question about the ADA’s application to arrests of armed and violent suspects?
0:01–7:52
2
How do the Justices address the alleged “bait‑and‑switch” between the petition and the arguments presented?
7:52–14:03
3
What is the significance of the “direct threat” exception and how is it interpreted by the Court?
14:03–21:06
4
How do the parties argue about the existence of a circuit split on accommodations in exigent arrests?
21:06–28:26
5
What role does the statutory definition of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 12132 play in this case?
28:26–35:06
6
How do the Justices evaluate the factual dispute over the risk to the public versus the need for accommodation?
35:06–44:10
7
What are the arguments concerning qualified immunity and the applicability of Fourth Amendment precedent?
44:10–50:20
8
How do the parties conclude on the policy implications and the Court’s potential resolution of the case?
50:20–58:18