Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt (18-315)

argument 18-315

Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt

Supreme Court of the United States 55 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the Eleventh Circuit’s equitable tolling rule and why does the government object?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument this morning in case 18315, Cochise Consultancy versus the United States ex-rel Billy Joe Hunt. Mr. Boutros?

Unknown 0:10

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Eleventh Circuit held that a relator who waited seven years to file suit after witnessing an alleged fraud against the United States Government was entitled to rely on the equitable tolling principle, the discovery rule, that is established by Section 3731B2 of the False Claims Act, even though the Government declined to intervene in the suit. Under this approach, a relator could conceal from the United States and could wait to sue for a decade and still take advantage of the principle of equitable tolling. This reading of Section 3731B2 contradicts this Court's interpretive approach in the Graham case. It defies default tolling rules, and it would produce counterintuitive results that Congress cannot possibly have intended.

Unknown 0:58

Let me begin with the text. In this Court's decision in Graham, interpreting the False Claims Act, it held that these provisions must be interpreted in context, not in isolation. And in particular, it focused on the language under Section 3730, which is contained in Section 3731B2. And here, the statutory context confirms that that language, action under Section 3730, as incorporated into subsection B2, is limited to those actions where the United States is a party, either because it's intervened or it filed a complaint. And Graham said — Isn't the United States, in some sense, a party even if it hasn't intervened? After all, it's going to get the lion's share of the recovery. And if I understand correctly, the suit can't be dismissed without notice and approval by the United States

Unknown 2:00

The government does have certain rights, Your Honor, when it does not intervene, but it is not a party. This Court held that in the Eisenstadt case. And the key here, Your Honor, is if we look at the text of the statute, there are multiple textual cues. The first are that the provision, Section 3731B2, only refers to the United States. And the statute refers to relators and the United States separately throughout. But it only refers to the United States. And as Judge Wilkinson In the Sanders case, when the Fourth Circuit noted, it makes no sense to apply this tolling provision to a relator where the United States is not involved. The language is that the knowledge of the official of the United States charged with responsibility to act in the circumstances triggers the statute of limitations.

Unknown 2:47

So knowledge of a third party that's not a party to the case would somehow put the plaintiff who's the relator, who's not an injured party, on notice that there's a claim. It could start the clock ticking without the relator even knowing it.

Sonia Sotomayor 3:00

Mr. Boutros, I understand your argument that a non-intervention case is not a civil action under Section 3730 for purposes of B2. And the arguments you've just given us, I acknowledge those in your response to Justice Ginsburg. But I believe you still take the position that the very same case is a civil action under 3730 for purposes of B1. And so you'd have us interpret that introductory language to B in two different ways, one for B1 and the other for B2. How do we manage that? That's quite a feat, don't you think? I don't think

Unknown 3:40

it's difficult at all, Your Honor. And in Graham,

Sonia Sotomayor 3:43

the Court said— Well, Graham—sorry to interrupt you there, but I just put my cards on the table so you can play them as you wish. In Graham, we held that retaliation claims just simply aren't covered by this provision at all, and they don't qualify under that introductory language for either purposes of B1 or B2. Here you're asking us to split the baby, as it were, and we normally don't read the same language to mean two different things, and I believe that's the problem you faced that we did not face in Graham.

Unknown 4:15

Well, actually, Your Honor, in Graham that exact issue was presented. The Court said in discussing Section 3731A, D, which at the time was subsection C, that the language action brought under section 3730 meant only actions brought under the United States in that provision.