Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski (22-105)
argument 22-105Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 22m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the legal significance of the divestiture rule (Griggs) in arbitration appeals?
Our argument next in case 22-105, Coinbase v. Bielski. Mr. Cottiel.
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. When a party appeals the denial of a motion to compel arbitration, it stays litigation. That result follows from the centuries-old divestiture rule, as well as by Congress's choice to adopt an asymmetric interlocutory rule in FAA Section 16A. The parties today agree on a lot, notably that the divestiture rule of Griggs is the law. The filing of a notice of appeal divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. The only question today is whether district court proceedings are aspects of the case involved in the appeal? For three reasons, the answer is yes. First, Congress amended the FAA to allow immediate appeals when district courts deny motions to compel arbitration, but not when they approve them.
And Congress did something else unusual. It made those appeals non-discretionary. Those choices reflect Congress's fear of about the interim harm from continued litigation. In 1988, Griggs was ensconced as the law, and Congress knew that authorizing these interlocutory appeals would authorize the usual stays, too. Indeed, when Congress wants to prevent a mandatory stay, they say so expressly with anti-stay laws. Congress enacted such a provision one day before 16A was enacted, but 16A has no anti-stay provision. Second, These appeals involve the entirety of the district court case. An arbitration agreement does two things. First, it bans district court proceedings, and second, is an affirmative consent to an alternative process.
The whole point of an immediate appeal is to protect those rights before they're lost. And third, it's undisputed that district court action is stayed in other interlocutory contexts, such as qualified immunities. Arbitration is no different and shouldn't be treated less favorably than other rights, the very thing Congress enacted the FAA to protect against. I welcome the Court's questions.
Haven't we treated qualified immunity differently from other interlocutory appeals?
I don't believe so, Your Honor. I mean, certainly with respect to collateral order doctrine, you've said that qualified immunity creates a collateral order, and here Congress has basically put 16A appeals, arbitration appeals on it. But with respect to qualified immunity in cases like Mitchell v. Forsyth, you've acknowledged that once someone invokes qualified immunity, it basically stops discovery and
trial proceeding. I think my point is that qualified immunity, I think, would be a bad example of how we would normally treat interlocutory appeals. Can you give me another example where the stay would be automatic?
So I think in general, the divestiture rule applies. The question, Griggs, applies. The question in any given case is what that rule means in practice. So, for example, take the criminal interlocutory appeal statute, 18 U.S.C. 3731. It doesn't say a word about its state, but it will authorize the government to have an interlocutory appeal. And what courts have said there is that there is a divestiture rule and it prevents things like the trial from going forward, but things short of the trial are okay because it doesn't conflict with Congress's authorization of the right.
Well, let me be clear, and this is my final point. Does it follow automatically that when you have an interlocutory appeal, there's an automatic stay?
No.
So in general, it's not that there's an automatic stay. It follows that the divestiture rule applies, and then it depends on the particular context.
What does that mean?
So it means like in 3731, there's an interlocutory appeal, but it doesn't automatically stay, Justice Thomas, everything. There are still some trial proceedings that can occur. Here, like in qualified immunity, like in sovereign immunity, like in double jeopardy, the very right that Congress has authorized for that immediate appeal is is being taken away effectively by the district court if any litigation proceeds. Why is that different
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the legal significance of the divestiture rule (Griggs) in arbitration appeals?
0:00–11:05
2
How does Congress’s amendment to the FAA in 1988 affect automatic stays on interlocutory appeals?
11:05–22:40
3
Why do the parties argue that district‑court proceedings should be stayed during an appeal of a denied motion to compel arbitration?
22:40–33:56
4
What are the arguments about the background rule versus statutory silence on stays in Section 16A?
33:56–44:20
5
How do the justices’ questions on qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, and double jeopardy illustrate the broader stay issue?
44:20–55:49
6
What practical examples of irreparable harm do the advocates cite to support an automatic stay?
55:49–1:04:48
7
How might rapid appellate review or discretionary stays address concerns about settlement pressure and litigation costs?
1:04:48–1:14:16
8
What is the final position of the counsel on whether Congress intended an automatic stay in this case?
1:14:16–1:22:20