Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md. (10-1016)

argument 10-1016

Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md.

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 0m 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 7 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the opening argument and who is presenting the case?

John G. Roberts 0:01
We'll hear argument first this morning in case ten ten sixteen Coleman versus the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Mr. Foreman.
Michael Foreman 0:10
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. the propriety of any Section five legislation. is judged by in reference to the historical perspective that it reflects. And that historical perspective uh is very clear in by and it's said very clearly by Congress and by this court. It it it is an unfortunate long history of state sponsored gender discrimination. And those that Discrimination. embodies gender based stereotypes that took a very firm hold in the employment year. where women had difficulty obtaining employment and holding employment. And this court, in a litany of cases, recognized these gender based stereotypes. uh as as an improper assumption about women's abilities in Frontier Frontiero versus Richardson.
Michael Foreman 1:10
Uh it rejected Uh this issue that women's mission were to be women uh to be uh wives and mothers, Stanton versus Stanton. uh that women were to be the homemaker And men the breadwinner. And
Anthony M. Kennedy 1:29
Well, Mr Foreman, I I guess the question in this case is what this particular statutory provision has to do with gender discrimination and the history of gender discrimination, whether Congress was aiming Uh to uh uh eradicate gender discrimination through this provision or whether it was trying to do something else entirely.
Michael Foreman 1:51
uh a and it was directly attempting to address these gender based stereotypes uh in a couple different ways as a practical matter. At that time when An employer saw a woman. They didn't necessarily just see a worker. They saw a person that could become pregnant. and worked on these gender based stereotypes that that woman would either become pregnant uh would be disabled because of pregnancy related disabilities, uh but in any event was a least uh least attractive employee. And the Family and Medical Leave Act addresses that specifically in its purposes section. It specifically says Um that is intended to promote the equal opportunity for women and men facility equal protection clause, but more specific to the self care provision.
Michael Foreman 2:50
Congress made it very clear what they were tr attempting to do. If you move to the finding section, first in finding number six. Uh they address what
John G. Roberts 3:00
where are you reading from, Council?
Michael Foreman 3:02
Uh I am reading from Appendix uh A to the brief and it is uh That employment standards that apply to one gender only have a serious potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees and applicants of employment who are of that gender. That's the negative inference argument that we make in our brief. But even more to the point, if you move to the purpose sections at Appendix two, page Appendix 2, it specifically is intended to minimize the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally that leave is available for eligible medical reasons, including maternity-related disabilities, and for compelling family reasons and to ensure equal protection.
Samuel A. Alito 3:54
Following up on Justice Kagan's question, I have I have difficulty seeing how uh providing twelve weeks of leave for self care for both men and women affects the incentive of an employer who we will assume has uh an inclination to discriminate uh against women based on the possibility that uh a a woman applicant for employment may become pregnant. I I just don't see how that would affect the incentives of of an employer in that situation.
Michael Foreman 4:29
The rationale of Congress at that point was that they could address this issue several different ways. And they passed A, B, and C, the birth of the child, the adoption of the child, and the Family and Medical Leave Act, against again addressing gender-based stereotypes.
Samuel A. Alito 4:47
Well A is not at issue, right? Okay, so we're just dealing with D, which concerns a serious health condition. So you have an em an employer who's willing to discriminate on the basis of gender and ha the employer has two applicants for employment, uh a man and a woman, and the employer says, Well, if I hired a man, he might take

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