Coleman v. Tollefson (13-1333)
argument 13-1333Coleman v. Tollefson
Supreme Court of the United States
55 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the Three‑Strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and why does it require a filing fee?
We'll hear argument next in case thirteen thirteen thirty three, Coleman versus Tollofson. Mr. Shamagan?
Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Under the Three Strikes Provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner who has three prior dismissals on prior occasions must pay the full filing fee before bringing suit. While the three strikes provision specifies what types of dismissal qualify as strikes, it does not expressly specify when a dismissal counts as a strike. The better view is that a dismissal does not count until it becomes final on appeal. That view is consistent both with the text of the three strikes provision and with the PRA's underlying. Does
it include a petition for cert or is only the first level appeal?
The time for the filing of a petition for cert would count under our view, which is to say that a dismissal would not qualify as a strike until that time is complete.
Until either there is a petition filed and it is denied or until the time expires to file the petition. That is correct. That is
correct. And that is a quite familiar rule, Justice Ginsburg. It is the rule that this court has applied with regard to the running of limitations periods for habeas petitions, for example, in clay versus United States.
Sure it is. But if if that were the case, why why would the statute have to refer Separately. to dismissals for frivolousness by the district court or by the Court of Appeals. You could just it could have just said if he's had a a petition dismissed for frivolousness, period. And that would mean it would have to go all the way up. Justice Scalia separately says by the District Court or by the Court of Appeals.
It is certainly true that a qualifying dismissal by a Court of Appeals, like a qualifying dismissal by a district court, qualifies as a distinct strike. And so therefore a prisoner could get two strikes in a single case. But we would respectfully submit that that really tells us nothing about the separate question of when those dismissals come to strike.
On your theory, he wouldn't get two. He'd just get one. No, that is the the dismissal is simply not final until the Court of Appeals acts, and that's one dismissal.
But there would still be two dismissals. And let me explain how our interpretation works, because I think that this is an imperial.
No, I I understand what you are saying, but it doesn't make any sense. It doesn't make any sense for Congress to want a finality rule.
And yet to count it twice. I don't think that there is any inconsistency and let me explain why that is so. In our view, the critical phrase in the statute is the phrase prior occasion. And to be sure, an occasion is triggered at the point at which a dismissal is entered. But in our view, the occasion is not complete until the appellate process has run its course. So in a case in which a district court enters a qualifying dismissal, that is to say, a dismissal on the ground that the action is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim, the occasion is complete only when the appellate process runs its course, and so too, when the Court of Appeals, if it enters a qualifying dismissal on those similar grounds.
A separate occasion is initiated by the dismissal and it too ends when further review is complete.
I would I would think occasion means At any time prior, whether it's at the Court of whether it's at the district court of the Court of Appeals. You you read a why can occasion only mean what you suggest or e
mean what you suggest, period. We don't believe that it could only mean what we suggest, which is to say that we don't think that the text precludes an interpretation under which the occasion is coterminous with the act of dismissal. We simply don't think that that is the only possible interpretation of the statutory language. For one thing, we think that it is notice notable that the statute uh does not provide that a mere affirmance of a district court dismissal qualifies as a distinct strike. So in other words, in a case in which a district court dismisses on one of the specified grounds, and then the Court of Appeals simply affirms, I think everyone would agree that there is only one strike.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Three‑Strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act and why does it require a filing fee?
0:00–7:11
2
When does a dismissal count as a “strike” – is it only after the appeal is final?
7:11–14:35
3
How do district‑court dismissals and appellate dismissals each create separate strikes?
14:35–21:36
4
What role do stays, IFP status, and Rule 60(b)(5) play when a third‑strike dismissal is pending?
21:36–29:01
5
Does the statute’s language about “prior occasions” include the appeal itself or only the original action?
29:01–35:30
6
What are the policy concerns – could counting appeals as strikes create a flood‑gate of frivolous lawsuits?
35:30–41:59
7
How do courts interpret the statute for administrability – should they treat each dismissal as final only after appeal?
41:59–48:08
8
What is the practical impact for prisoners filing multiple suits – can a reversed third strike be undone?
48:08–56:05