Collins v. Virginia (16-1027)

argument 16-1027

Collins v. Virginia

Supreme Court of the United States 55 min 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the core Fourth Amendment issue in Collins v. Virginia?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear an argument next in case sixteen ten twenty seven, Collins versus Virginia.
Mr.
John G. Roberts 0:05
Fitzgerald.
Nicholas Fitzgerald 0:07
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The warrant requirement for the home in cartilage cannot be overthrown by the automobile exception. Under the Commonwealth's argument, On probable cause alone. An officer may search a vehicle anywhere that he finds it. and may go anywhere that he needs to in order to access that vehicle. That rule cannot survive foundational Fourth Amendment principles. Searches of the home and curtilage without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable as this Court has often recognised. So the rule we ask this Court to adopt is that the automobile exception does not apply to a vehicle found in the cartilage of the home.
Elena Kagan 0:54
What was the The police have probable cause to believe that the vehicle is stolen and they even get a warrant. to uh inspect the vehicle. But the vehicle is parked in this port. Do they need do they need a warrant to go get the car for which they
Nicholas Fitzgerald 1:29
Have a warrant. Well, Your Honor, the the warrant would specify the place to be searched for the car, and so commonly a warrant would say, for instance, uh the dwelling and curtilage to look for this motorcycle. So the warrant that authorizes the search of the motorcycle would by its terms authorize the intrusion into the cartilage to the same thing. But what if it did? But what if
Samuel A. Alito 1:49
it didn't? So they have a warrant here, let's say, to search for they have probable cause to search this thing covered by a t a tarp. They have a warrant to search this motorcycle because it's been involved in criminal activity. They want to get the vehicle identification number from it, uh and they see it. let's say it's parked two feet from the curb uh But m arguably or it's parked where it is here, maybe in the cartilage, maybe not in the cartilage. The w that warrant would be insufficient.
Nicholas Fitzgerald 2:23
Well, Your Honor, the Fourth Amendment by its terms requires a warrant to specify the place to be searched. So if they've seen the motorcycle in that spot and they get a warrant, the warrant would say this house on Del Mead Avenue may have included the picture and it would by its terms authorise the access to that.
Samuel A. Alito 2:41
I mean this is my question about your argument based on the cartilage. We we ask whether uh a search within or outside the cartilage in order to determine whether the Fourth Amendment applies at all. But that's not really the question here, because there is probable cause. And there is the motor vehicle exception to the requirement. So the issue is not whether there was a search. Yes, there was a search. And yes, you know, if it wa if it was the cartilage then there was uh there there was uh uh an intrusion on the protected area. But the Warr the motor vehicle exception to the warrant requirement I take it is based on two things. One is the uh the mo the risk that the vehicle is going to be moved during the time when the warrant is sought.
Samuel A. Alito 3:35
And second is a consideration on the other side of the risk that if there's not a warrant the police will be wrong about probable cause and the degree of intrusion on property. on legitimate property interests that occur in that situation. It's a balancing. It's not a consideration of whether it's on the cartilage or not. And it's hard to see why the balance is any different here than it would be if this motorcycle had been parked on the street. the the risk that it will be moved seems to be almost exactly the same, and Wha what is the additional invasion of privacy? The invasion of privacy that's involved in walking a few feet up a driveway and the home is not even Mr. Bird's home. Why does the balance come out different here?
Nicholas Fitzgerald 4:24
Well, Your Honor, so here's here's the way that I think about that. Um if you're looking at the terms that support the automobile exception, you have ready mobility and you have the lessened expectation of privacy. But the cartilage and the home uh are essentially more important concerns than that. So for instance, um if I had uh a fistful of cocaine and I'm out in public

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