Cruz v. Arizona (21-846)

argument 21-846

Cruz v. Arizona

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 1m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the background of John Cruz’s death‑penalty case and why is Simmons relevant?

Mr. Cottiel 0:00

Our argument next in case twenty one eight forty six, Cruz versus Arizona.

John G. Roberts 0:04

Mr Cotiel.

Mr. Cottiel 0:05

Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. In two thousand five, John Cruz was sentenced to death. The judge instructed jurors that without a death sentence, Cruz would face, quote, life imprisonment with a possibility of parole. The judge did so despite this court's decision eleven years earlier in Simmons. Cruz's jury labored under a seriously wrong idea. Indeed, the jury foreman the very next day said Quote, We wanted a reason to be lenient, and many of us would have rather voted for life, but we were not given an option to vote for life in prison without the possibility of parole. Cruz wasn't the only one. Twelve separate times twelve separate times the Arizona Supreme Court wrote decisions refusing to apply Simmons.

Mr. Cottiel 0:52

In twenty sixteen, this court summarily reversed all this in Lynch, fundamentally changing capital trials in Arizona. Cruz then used Lynch to seek postconviction relief under Arizona Rule thirty two point one G, yet the Arizona Supreme Court refused, saying Lynch didn't change the law, it just changed the application of the law. That interpretation of Rule 32 is not an adequate and independent state ground for three separate reasons. First, to be adequate, an interpretation must be firmly established and regularly followed. This hair-splitting distinction between changes in the law and applications of the law is entirely novel, entirely handcrafted. The state doesn't even defend it. Second, the decision below discriminates against

Mr. Cottiel 1:40

federal rights. It places defendants like Cruz in a catch twenty-two. To prevail under federal law, they have to argue that Lynch applied a settled rule, but that very argument dooms their claims under state law. It also discriminates against decisions of this court by giving them narrower effect. And finally, the decision below is not independent. It's interwoven with federal questions. The Arizona Supreme Court's analysis of Rule 32 turned on its reading of this court's precedence. Simmons was the law of the land in forty nine states, all except Arizona. Arizona is an extreme outlier, and for that reason today it stands alone in this court. None of the other forty nine states, not a single one, is supporting them.

Mr. Cottiel 2:21

If I could start with the first point about novelty.

Clarence Thomas 2:28

I understand Simmons and Lynch. Uh but w I understand the Arizona Supreme Court to be saying it does not uh uh under our rules, uh uh there's nothing more here. Th they simply interpreted their Rule thirty two. And how do we get from that interpretation of their rule to a federal questi federal issue?

Mr. Cottiel 2:55

Right. Each of these three arguments, Justice Thomas, are things this Court has used before to get to the Federal issue. So first, with respect to novelty. If a State enacts a procedural rule that is only about state law, but it is a barrier to Federal claims, or is novel in some way, this Court, time and again, starting with Justice Holmes in nineteen oh four, going to this Court's much more recent decisions, have said that it has got to be firmly established and regularly followed. And that's so for two reasons. One is if it's a novel rule, it might be discriminating against Federal rights, and that is a tell. The other is that you have to provide fair warning to the defendant. And the case law talks about both.

Mr. Cottiel 3:37

And in case after case, Your Honor, this Court has done exactly that on novelty. So that's the first point. The second is is the other way the second way you get to a federal issue is that this court polices, indeed the court in Walker said it's regularly said that if an interpretation discriminates against a federal right, even if it's purely a matter of state law, take for example this Court's decision just last year in Espinosa versus versus Montana, that was purely interpreting a state th a state constitutional provision, but there was a federal question lurking under that. And that is true here as well because of the discrimination. And then the third is that it's interwoven with federal law.