Culbertson v. Berryhill (17-773)
argument 17-773Culbertson v. Berryhill
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the central legal question about the meaning of “such representation” in §406(b)?
We'll hear argument next in case seventeen seven seven seven seven seven seven seven three,
Colbertson versus Berryhill. Mr Ortiz. Mr Chief Justice, may it please the Court. This case turns on the meaning of two words in section four hundred oh six B, such representation. Do they refer to work done only before the court, the only representation discussed in Section four hundred six B itself, but do they also include work done before the agency, which is subject to a separate award mechanism in Section four hundred six A? In this case, Your Honors, the statute's text, its structure, its purposes and its history all confirm that Section four hundred six B's CAP applies only to work done in court. First, the text. Section four hundred oh six B references explicitly and only work done in the court.
It is in a single sentence it says whenever a court renders a judgment favourable to a claimant who is represented before the court by an attorney, the court may allow a reasonable fee for such representation. The dictionary meaning of the word such of the sort previously mentioned confirms what is commonsensical. So does the doctrine of the canon of expressio unius. Section four hundred six A, by contrast, speaks of work done before the Commissioner. Section four hundred oh six B speaks only of work done before the court. Congress also, Your Honour, knew how to create an aggregate cap if it wanted to, in Section four hundred and six A two C. It creates an aggregate cap. for claims cases involving both claims under Title II and Title sixteen, and it uses the words in the aggregate.
Congress likewise knew how to create offsets, as it did in the Equal Access to Justice Act. Also, Your Honours, the structure of the Act makes this clear. In Gizbrecht, this Court said that the statute handles discreetly. claims for work before the agency and claims before the court. Can I ask you a question about um the the cat. You're saying there's a cap in B w and that applies to court services. n not too uh services before the agency. But is there Yeah. a cap on the amount that can be taken from the plaintiff's re recovery. That is Let's say the we agree with you that the B Cap is the court only. It doesn't apply to administrative services. Can more be taken From the plaintiff's recovery. Um Uh what is it, twenty five percent.
Uh no, Justice Ginsburg. The agency has taken the position which is not contested in this litigation, that there is a separate twenty five percent pay cap which apply. They will set aside the amount of past due benefits and withhold the twenty five percent for the payment of attorney's fees under both four hundred and six B and four hundred oh six A. So that is an upper limit in this case.
Um I'm troubled by the idea of attorneys attempting to collect fees directly from their clients. Now I understand from the briefing that you can't garnish disability benefits. So Um if you don't get paid uh your percentage, you can't garnish disability benefits, but w how can you collect otherwise? You don't collect over the fund that Justice Ginsburg is describing.
No, no, no.
Don't you think that Congress wouldn't have wanted social security recipients to be hounded by collection efforts?
Well, Your Honor, first I want to correct what may be a misconception. It is not the case that when the 25 percent authorization cap is used up, that attorneys, if they want to recover fees beyond that, would beheld, would actually have to go against the claimant directly. In any case when there is an EJA award, as there are an over forty percent of these cases. And the EJO award is equal to or exceeds the four oh six A award. the attorney can actually get the money from the mouth that the agency is still I
understood here there was some Easure money that you could have received. But I am talking about the extreme possibility. Where there's a small ESU award but you get fifty percent of the recovery. Are we going to have people garnishing something or attaching something that belongs to clients?
Not in most cases, Your Honor.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal question about the meaning of “such representation” in §406(b)?
0:00–7:11
2
How does the petitioner argue that §406(b) applies only to work done before the court?
7:11–14:16
3
What is the agency’s position on the 25% cap for attorney fees and how does it affect both court and agency work?
14:16–21:36
4
How do the Justices’ questions clarify the practical impact of the aggregate fee cap on claimants?
21:36–29:31
5
What are the arguments regarding the possibility of attorneys collecting fees beyond the 25% cap?
29:31–37:10
6
How does the discussion address the interplay between EAJA awards and the statutory fee limits?
37:10–43:27
7
What historical and legislative evidence is used to support a 25% aggregate cap interpretation?
43:27–51:02
8
What conclusion does the Court reach about the proper reading of §406(b) and the aggregate fee cap?
51:02–58:10