Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee (15-446)

argument 15-446

Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 1m 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 4 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central issue the Court is being asked to decide in Cuozzo v. Lee?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear an argument next in case fifteen four four Six, Cruz O Speed Technologies versus Lee. Mr Beaney?

Unknown 0:08

Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. I would like to begin this morning with why the use of the broadest reasonable interpretation expedient in no way comports with the congressional purpose of interpartis review and then address why the Board's ultravirous determination in instituting interpartes review is subject to judicial review. Consistent with history, uh Congress left uh to the judiciary to determine construction standards. And therefore in the American Invents Act There is no explicit statutory language directing the Patent and Trademark Office to use any particular a standard of uh claim construction. But this Court should reverse as a matter of statutory construction for four reasons.

Unknown 0:55

First, in summary, All agree that the borderist reasonable interpretation expedient. demands a broad ability to amend claims. And that's so because the broadest reasonable interpretation brings into play a broader array of prior art that may be distinguishable if the claims were given their actual interpretation. an established interpartist review. Congress sought to substitute and provide a district court like litigation for the determination of patentability and therefore did not provide the wide liberty to amend claims.

Elena Kagan 1:30

I might be moved by your argument if Congress had not given any right for the board to amend. Because that would be consistent with practices in the district court, where the district court can't amend under any circumstance. But basically Congress here um said you can amend once. I am not sure

Unknown 1:53

that

Elena Kagan 1:54

that

Unknown 1:54

supports your proposition. Justice Sotemeyer, I think there's a distinction between allowing a party to make a motion to amend and the absolute right to amend even once. And Congress uh did not provide any right to amend in interparties review. It provided only an extremely limited ability to seek to amend. And in fact in practice That opportunity to seek to amend is almost always denied. And it is denied, consistent with congressional intent of establishing interpartase review to be court a court like adjudication. So simply as a matter of numbers, the board has denied ninety five percent of the motions to amend. In forty two months of interpartase review Uh the board has allowed five motions to amend and allowed four less than thirty claims to be amended while canceling ten thousand claims.

John G. Roberts 2:50

What's the second of your four?

Unknown 2:52

Uh the second reason why, uh, Your Honour the re result below should be reversed is because the Congress in establishing Interpartes Review intended Interpartis Review to adjudicate Property rights. In doing so, it makes no sense to attribute to those property rights a hypothetical interpretation of their meets and bounds. rather than doing what district courts do. Which is to give claims their actual plain and ordinary meaning. The third reason, uh uh Your Honours, why this Court should reverse and and have the Patent and Trademark Office use uh the ordinary claim construction matter is because there are a number of anomalies that injure the patent system and injure patentees. that stem directly from the use of interpartis review.

Unknown 3:44

Those include A claim meaning different things in the courts and before the board. Those include different results in the courts and the board as to whether patentee's property rights are taken away. And those include claims meaning one thing for patentability in the board, but a wholly different thing for infringement in the district courts. That's simply untenable and there's no reason to suspect that that was anywhere within Congress's intent in actor in enacting interparties review. Finally, this Court should reverse because the government really has not in any way offered a support of using the broadest reasonable interpretation. That is in any way tethered to interpartees review. It simply says historically we have done this before and so we should be permitted to do it again.

Unknown 4:30

Strikingly missing from the government's position, however, is really any objection to taking the district court's substitute that Congress enacted and using the claim construction that the district courts do, the ordinary meaning of the claim terms.