Daimler AG v. Bauman (11-965)
argument 11-965Daimler AG v. Bauman
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the Ninth Circuit’s “general jurisdiction” rule for Daimler and why is it contested?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case eleven nine six five Daimler A. G. versus Bauman. Mr. Dupree.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The Ninth Circuit held that DIMA, a foreign corporation, is subject to general jurisdiction in California, and thus may be sued in California on any claim arising anywhere in the world. The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion by attributing to Daimler the California contacts of a Daimler subsidiary, Mercedes Benz USA. A separate corporation that respects all corporate formalities and that is not Daimler's alter ego. The Ninth Circuit's approach violates due process.
Do we have to reach that question? I mean I guess the Ninth Circuit must have been interpreting the uh long arms statute of California, right? That's correct, Justice Clay. Now are there were there California cases that uh disregarded the the the corporate form?
California respects the corporate form. The Ninth Circuit applied what appears to be a federal common law of agency that the Ninth Circuit admittedly developed solely for purposes of the jurisdictional inquiry.
But the jurisdictional inquiry is conducted on the basis of the California statute, isn't it?
It is, but at the same time the California statute extends to the limit of due process and so what the Ninth Circuit did was it construed what the permissible outer bounds of the due process clause was in this context.
I see. It's it's California's reference. to the outer bounds of jurisdiction. That causes causes this to be a constitutional case. That's correct, Justice Clear.
There's nothing in the constitution, is there, that would prohibit a state from adopting a rule that Uh A parent is responsible for any acts of a wholly owned subsidiary.
Well, Mr. Chief Justice, there may be a constitutional limit, certainly to the extent that, say, California adopted a rule that said for purposes of some sort of liability we are going to disregard the corporate form, I think that could pose due process concerns to the extent that it is purporting to override, say, the corporate law of Delaware.
Well even um on a prospective basis. Your brief talks about notice and fairness and predictability. Um uh but if California said going forward this is the rule that we're going to apply, is there any constitutional problem with that?
I I still think there would be, Mr. Chief Justice. In other words, I take your Honor's point about fair notice if California said going forward, this is the rule we're going to apply. But at the same time, I'm not quite sure what in the Constitution would empower, say, California to essentially override, say, Delaware's corporate law and say, for our state purposes, we're essentially going to rewrite the corporate DNA of a corporation that's chartered in Delaware in order to
I beg your pardon, yeah. We permitted that in container core. We re permitted California law. to tax the parent California corporation for the earnings of all its foreign subsidiaries. And we said the due process clause wasn't offended by that.
Well, Justice Sotomayor, typically this court has applied a less rigorous due process standard in the tax cases than it has in the personal jurisdiction cases. If one were to look at, say, Goodyear or McIntyre of any of this court's more recent jurisdictional decisions, it typically takes a much more rigorous view of the due process clause's limits on a sovereign's ability to adjudicate matters that arise outside the forum than it has in the tax context.
We would never get to this question. If you hadn't conceded that there is general jurisdiction over the US uh subsidiary over what is it, M B USA.
Well, Justice Ginsburg, I respectfully disagree that we conceded the point below. I'm not sure, frankly, that we could concede something like that on behalf of a different corporation that's not a party to this lawsuit. But it is true that we focused on the attribution question in the Ninth Circuit. And at the end of the day, I don't think that that point affects the outcome in this case because
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Ninth Circuit’s “general jurisdiction” rule for Daimler and why is it contested?
0:01–7:21
2
How does the Court view the attribution of Mercedes‑Benz USA’s contacts to its German parent?
7:21–15:45
3
Why do the Justices argue that California’s long‑arm statute may exceed due‑process limits?
15:45–23:00
4
What constitutional concerns arise from treating a wholly‑owned subsidiary as an alter‑ego of its parent?
23:00–30:29
5
How do specific‑jurisdiction precedents like *Asahi* and *McIntyre* apply to this case?
30:29–36:58
6
Why do the parties dispute whether Daimler itself is “at home” in California?
36:58–44:22
7
What would be the impact of adopting a bright‑line rule that only a corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of business creates general jurisdiction?
44:22–51:59
8
What relief do the parties seek from the Supreme Court – reversal, remand, or dismissal as improvidently granted?
51:59–58:49