Dean v. United States (15-9260)

argument 15-9260

Dean v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 58 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the central legal question about judicial discretion under § 924(c)?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument this morning in case fifteen ninety two sixty, Dean versus United States. Mr. Stoller.
Mr. Stoller 0:06
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. The question confronting confronting this court is whether a judge can exercise discretion That sentencing in light of congressional directives In section nine twenty four C that a thirty year mandatory minimum must be imposed as part of the total sentence. Throughout the Sentencing Reform Act, and the myriad of factors set forth for a judge to consider in arriving at an aggregate sentence that meets the overarching goals of being sufficient but not greater than necessary. And we submit that there is nothing in the language of section nine twenty four C To prevent the judge from reducing the portion of the sentence for crimes of violence. We don't
John G. Roberts 0:46
doubt that if uh the the the mandatory minimums were out of the picture and all we had was the underlying offense here, that this uh sentence would be reversed on appeal, do you?
Mr. Stoller 0:57
I would I would submit yes. Um but in reducing
Unknown 1:03
in nine twenty four C. But there is a bar on concurrent sentencing. And reading the statute the way you do. Would shrink. the concurrency to the vanishing point. If it have Ed only one day. To the the nine twenty four C sentence.
Mr. Stoller 1:25
Well the concurrent provision requires that uh it it does not It runs in addition to the predicate offence, but the concurrent Language in there is the same language that we would find, for example, in section ten twenty eight A of the statutes, which has that same language, but it goes farther. When you look at the language in ten twenty eight A, it follows the same roadmap that nine twenty four C has. But it's twenty years later, right? It's twenty years later, but but uh nine twenty four C has has been recalibrated over time starting in nineteen sixty eight. And even after ten twenty eight A came into existence, in two separate times Congress has uh changed provisions in ten excuse me, in nine twenty four C.
Mr. Stoller 2:09
to change the types of guns that we have to do.
Anthony M. Kennedy 2:15
And say you had to argue from this language, and this essentially repeats Justice Ginsburg's point. But this language says it shall run consecutively, it shall not run concurrently. And your version of this statute essentially allows a district court to negate that language. It's as if uh that language were not there in terms of what the d uh the the district court can do.
Mr. Stoller 2:40
Well we we submit that the district court has to give some sentence for the underlying crimes of violence
Anthony M. Kennedy 2:47
and then those
Mr. Stoller 2:47
the
Anthony M. Kennedy 2:48
Well some sentence, you know, a day, six hours, whatever it is, but can essentially make that Uh that that disappear. I mean it you know, it's con concurrent m plus a day. I mean that couldn't have been what Congress meant, concurrent plus a day, when it said it shall only be consecutive.
Mr. Stoller 3:07
Well Congress, we assume, knows how to write the laws that they write and They uh had the ability to strictly uh limit and they have in in nine twenty four C to some extent as far as it having to be uh Well you're right the
Anthony M. Kennedy 3:20
Congress did not say You uh it it did not say what it said in fact in ten twenty eight A. Um But uh you know, sometimes sometimes the way we try to understand statutes is to say any reading That utterly eviscerates. uh something the Congress clearly did say can't be a good reader.
Mr. Stoller 3:44
Well we would submit that the in addition to language is making sure that a separate crime is being separately punished, that being the nine twenty four C crimes that carry the mandatory minimums, in this case of thirty years. But the uh the language that that says consecutive also is is is meant to say that that it can't run with those those nine those uh underlying predicate offences. Council
Elena Kagan 4:09
um Mm. during the time the guidelines were mandatory, but afterwards Many, many Court of Appeals basically told district courts You can't impose a sentence simply because you disagree with the guidelines. You can impose it for independent reasons to ensure a just result, But you can't impose it merely because you don't like the guidelines.

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