Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin (145-Orig)
argument 145-OrigDelaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 8m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
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What statutory text does the case interpret and why is it important?
Your argument next in Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin and the
consolidated case. Mr. Katyal. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. This case concerns a piece of statutory text from 1974 in Section 2503, which is found in the blue brief appendix at page 2A. That provision exempts from the common law a narrow set of instruments, a money order, traveler's check, or other similar written instrument other than a third-party bank check. The question today is whether two products, MoneyGram agent checks and MoneyGram tellers checks, fall within that exemption. For many years, the defendant states answered that question no. However, after engaging some creative consultants, they changed their mind. They were right the first time for four separate reasons.
First, when Congress adopted that language in 1974, the term money order referred to specific commercial products labeled money order and typically sold to unbanked consumers to pay small debts. Neither of those apply to the two disputed instruments here. They're not labeled money order, and they are sold to consumers with bank accounts who are transferring larger sums of money. Second, the FDA was a surgical fix to this Court's 1972 decision with a key purpose behind it to prevent the price of small-dollar instruments from increasing due to address collection requirements that states might adopt in reaction to this Court's 1972 decision. That rationale does not apply here, and the two instruments are outside of the FDA altogether.
Third, even if you thought these products were within the FDA, the two instruments here fall within the third-party bank check exception. Like all bank checks, they are signed by bank employees, not purchasers. And fourth, while we believe that our reading is the best reading of the FDA's tax structure and purpose, we don't deny one could read the statute differently. But importantly, if you found things in equipoise, two things would independently break any tie for us – One is the doctrine of reading statutes to avoid derogation of the common law, and the other is this Court's repeated emphasis on the need for bright-line rules and predictability in this space. The defendant's interpretation would upend all of that, as their own amici acknowledge.
Our view of the statute, by contrast, is predictable, reflects long-standing practice, and provides a bright line for the achievement of financial products in the future.
How much weight do you put on this money order designation? What if Tomorrow morning they simply stamped the top of these, the two disputed instruments, money order, commercial money order. Would that solve your problem?
So, Justice Thomas, if they change the label, we do think that it would mean it's not a money order or a traveler's check. So we do think you look to the label for that. And indeed, I think that's what they say about traveler's checks. But we don't think it would be true for other similar instruments. So we think that in your hypothetical, in which you have the exact same instrument... But it has just a different name on it. That is another similar written instrument. Notably, you know, that's never happened. And the reason is because money orders and those labels are important for consumers and for banks. They want to know what they're getting. They want to know what they're selling. And that's why they can't point to a single example where that label has ever been stripped off.
But I agree with you, Justice Thomas, if that happened, that would fall within the FDA, your
hypothetical. Can you point to any reason in the past why this definition of money order is so narrow? It would seem to me that over time it's not necessarily as you say it is. a discrete set of instruments.
So we don't doubt, Justice Thomas, that there is a way to define money order as broadly as my friends on the other side do. If you do that, it blows up things like cashier's checks, certified checks, all the stuff that the American Bank Association is warning you about and that Judge LaValle couldn't get around because he just said, I'm not going to define
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory text does the case interpret and why is it important?
0:00–10:18
2
How does the argument define “money order” versus similar instruments?
10:18–18:17
3
Why do the parties dispute whether address‑collection requirements apply?
18:17–25:41
4
What are the four reasons the counsel gives for excluding the disputed instruments?
25:41–34:47
5
How does the label (or lack of it) affect the classification of MoneyGram checks?
34:47–43:47
6
What role does the Federal Disposition Act (FDA) play in the equity analysis?
43:47–52:32
7
How do the justices question the scope of “similar written instruments”?
52:32–1:02:36
8
What is the proposed statutory fix and why might it be preferred over litigation?
1:02:36–1:08:39