Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads (13-1080)
argument 13-1080Department of Transportation v. Association of American Railroads
Supreme Court of the United States
51 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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Why does the Court of Appeals consider Section 207 of PREA an unconstitutional delegation to a private entity?
We'll hear argument next this morning in case 13-1080, Department of Transportation versus the Association of American Railroads. Mr. Gannon.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the Court of Appeals held that Section 207 of PREA was unconstitutional because it believed that the statute constituted an actual delegation of regulatory authority to a private entity. And none of those three things is true about this statute. First, under LeBron, Amtrak should not be considered a private corporation for non-delegation purposes. Second, the metrics and standards are not regulatory. The regulatory effect here comes from the longstanding statutory preference requirement, which was enacted by Congress, not Amtrak, and is enforced by an independent adjudicative agency, the Surface Transportation Board. And third, requiring Amtrak to approve the metrics and standards before they went into effect is not a delegation outside the government.
under this Court's cases.
I think the LeBron argument, Marsh v. Alabama, the Company Town case, no one says that it was a governmental agency. It was just exercising governmental-like powers, which entitled the person to exercise free speech. That's all LeBron can stand for. You wouldn't say that Marsh v. Alabama, the Company Town, was a governmental agency after reading that opinion,
would
you?
No, I would say that after reading the opinion in LeBron, that the Court concluded that Amtrak is a governmental entity for things that Congress doesn't have. Well, you could
say the same thing about Marsh v. Alabama.
Well, I think that the difference is that the Court recognized in LeBron that Amtrak is a government-created corporation that is under the government's control, and that under the government's control both because of the management control that it has over it and because it created the purposes for which Amtrak exists and the things that it has to do. And the Court there distinguished between whether Amtrak is governmental for constitutional purposes that were beyond Congress's control, but acknowledged that Congress could control whether Amtrak was governmental for other purposes, other powers and privileges of government.
If Amtrak is governmental for non-delegation purposes, is it also — governmental for Appointments Clause purposes?
MR. Well, I think that that follows from the way the Court approached the question about the PCAOB and Free Enterprise Fund, where Congress had also enacted a statute that said the PCAOB was not an agency or instrumentality of government, that no Board members or employees were going to be considered officers or employees of the Federal Government. The parties in that case, which included the United States, did not dispute that the Appointments Clause and separation of powers concerns that were at issue there were were applicable to the PCAOB, notwithstanding those general statements by Congress. And we do think here —
I was just going to say, your argument that Amtrak is governmental for purposes, that doesn't get you to the finish line, right? I mean, if you had a law that said the Department of Defense and the Department of State will consult and jointly issue regulations, and if they don't, this private individual resolved for him, that would still present the same problems.
Well, I think, Mr. Chief Justice, you're referring to the arbitrator provision. Right. Before we get to the arbitrator provision, I do think that this would resolve the question. And ultimately, if this is not regulatory authority that cannot be conditioned — It wouldn't
resolve the question, only perhaps for delegation purposes. But But it doesn't resolve the other issue in the case, which is due process. That is to say, even if this is a governmental entity, there are some things that governmental entities can't do. Indeed, I think that the case law in this area relies on the due process clause more than on the distinction simply between public and private entities.
Well, to be sure, the Carter Cole case talked about both non-delegation ideas and also due process issues.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
Why does the Court of Appeals consider Section 207 of PREA an unconstitutional delegation to a private entity?
0:00–7:37
2
How does the LeBron decision affect Amtrak’s classification as a governmental or private corporation for non‑delegation purposes?
7:37–14:00
3
What is the role of the Surface Transportation Board in enforcing the statutory preference requirement and metrics‑and‑standards scheme?
14:00–21:01
4
When does the arbitration provision in Section 207 become relevant, and does it create a constitutional problem?
21:01–27:40
5
How do the metrics and standards trigger enforcement actions against freight railroads under the statutory preference requirement?
27:40–34:13
6
Why did Amtrak’s performance improve dramatically after the Court’s decision, and what does that reveal about regulatory impact?
34:13–39:47
7
In what ways does the case illustrate the tension between due‑process concerns and non‑delegation doctrine?
39:47–44:18
8
What arguments does the government present about accountability and congressional control over Amtrak’s regulatory authority?
44:18–51:45