Descamps v. United States (11-9540)
argument 11-9540Descamps v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 0m
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the central legal issue in Descamps v. United States?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case eleven ninety five forty. Descomp versus United States. Mr Johnson?
May it Mr Chief Justice, may it please the Court. uh in this case uh It doesn't matter what my client was convicted of in nineteen seventy eight in the state of California. What's important for the Armed Career Criminal Act is what he's convicted of. And as we all know, when you're to be convicted of a crime elements have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. or agreed to by a defendant after waiving his constitutional rights. Ін Калифорния. burglary uh unlawful entry as defined by the court in Taylor on what generic burglary consists of is not an element of California burglary. Any entry with the intent to commit a crime a theft or a felony will do. California jury is never required to actually find unlawful entry in the tailor sense.
Uh regardless of the defendant's conduct, a California burglary conviction is not, by its elements, tailored burglary For armed for a criminal act.
You don't take issue, do you, with the um argument. that in in determining what the state law is. You can take account not only of the words of the statute. but how the state Supreme Court interprets those words.
I I I don't take issue with that, Your Honor. I I think uh if the State's state courts uh clearly state something is an element of a crime. I I you know I I agree with that.
Well the California Supreme Court has said that an element of the burglary statute is the violation of some possessor interest. Now I know there's some disagreement uh between you and the government about that. But assuming for the sake of argument that that is an element One way for the California Court to express that is to say, simply, as it has, that an element is the violation of a possessor interest. Another way of saying exactly the same thing would be to say that the term enters under the California Burglary Statute means either breaking into a structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way. Those are exactly equivalent. Now if they were to say the latter Would a conviction under uh the statute potentially qualify under
Prime
Career Criminal Act?
I don't believe it would because I don't believe uh possessory interest equates to Taylor uh definition.
No, but they they set out alternative elements, either breaking into the structure or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way.
Well it If the elements are shown Uh And if that's the definition, Then yes. But I don't think California possessory interest is the same thing.
No, but they have said isn't do you dispute the fact that saying A an element is the violation of possessory interest and b the elements are breaking or the violation of the possessory interest in some other way are exactly the same substantively.
I I I don't, Your Honor, because in in the Taylor sense You have to have a uh unlawful uh trespass actually a trespass or an invasion of a person's uh Unlawful trespass. In California you don't have to have a trespass and as the court indicated in the Taylor decision, it talked about shoplifting in the state of California. So Is a shoplifter someone who should be subject to an armed career criminal act enhancement?
I thought your argument was that if the terms of a statute set out alternative ways of satisfying an element, you have alternative elements. In essence, that then even if some of those alternatives don't fall within generic burglary, if one does, then a conviction under that statute potentially can qualify.
All right. Now
what if the State Supreme Court says exactly the same thing? Your answer to Justice Ginsburg was it doesn't matter whether the elements are set out in the statute or whether they are defined by the state court.
Well I as I said, if if the element is set forth and it's a element that meets the definition of the generic definition in Taylor. Then I agree with you, but I d I don't believe California burglary does that because the entry with intent to commit a crime It is burglary in the case.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal issue in Descamps v. United States?
0:02–7:28
2
How does the Court define a “burglary” under California law versus the generic definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act?
7:28–14:02
3
What is the “modified categorical approach” and why does the government argue it should apply here?
14:02–20:51
4
Why does the petitioner claim that shoplifting should not count as a generic burglary for enhancement purposes?
20:51–28:38
5
How do the parties interpret the plea‑colloquy and what role does the Shepherd record play in determining the prior conviction?
28:38–37:19
6
What are the arguments concerning the residual‑clause risk analysis for ACA sentencing?
37:19–45:28
7
How might empirical sampling of California burglary convictions affect sentencing equity under the ACA?
45:28–53:38
8
What conclusions does the Court reach and what are the implications for future ACA cases?
53:38–1:00:39