Devillier v. Texas (22-913)
argument 22-913Devillier v. Texas
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 11m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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Transcript
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What is the central question about the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause in Devillier v. Texas?
We'll hear argument next uh in uh case twenty two nine thirteen. De Villier versus Texas, Mr McNamara.
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, the question presented in this case is resolved by the text of the Fifth Amendment, which, unlike any other provision of the Constitution, imposes on the government a an explicit duty to pay money. It's also answered by this Court's decision in First English, which holds that the just compensation remedy is mandatory and that the Fifth Amendment itself furnishes a basis on which a court can award just compensation in an inverse condemnation case. And this right of property owners to sue in inverse condemnation, to obtain just compensation for an alleged taking is at the heart of modern American takings law. heart of inverse condemnation claims filed against state and local governments nationwide, and it's also at the heart of every takings claim filed against the federal government under the Tucker Act.
The Tucker Act provides no cause of action, no substantive entitlement to a remedy. The cause of action, the substantive entitlement to a remedy in every Tucker Act takings case, is the self executing Fifth Amendment. The same cause of action recognised in First English, the same cause of action pled here. To reject that cause of action now is to upend the way lower courts, both state and federal, understand the Takings Clause to work, and also to abandon this court's consistent explanations of that clause, not just in First English, but in more recent cases, like NIC v. Township of Scott. And there's no reason to make that kind of drastic change. This Court has already recognized that money mandating legal obligations logically come along with the right to file a lawsuit to enforce those obligations.
That's true as to statutes, which is what this court held in Maine Community Health Options. It should be at least as true as to the Constitution. And this Court's precedents consistently teach that it is. I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh in your reply brief, uh you say that The nineteenth century federal courts were faced with a bedrock property right and no way to enforce it directly. Doesn't that seem to be at odds um the fact that the courts there had to resort to extra constitutional causes of action? That isn't that at odds with your argument now?
I don't think so, Your Honor. Because the primary problem facing federal courts in the early part of the nineteenth century was a lack of jurisdiction. And I think the question of jurisdiction is just conceptually distinct from the question of whether there's a cause of action, whether there's a right to a remedy. Congress could tomorrow uh amend Section 1331 to reimpose an amount of controversy uh limit. And if it did that, that That would prevent a number of people from bringing ex parte young actions in federal court. Those claims wouldn't cease to exist. This Congress would just have eliminated the jurisdiction over them. And so I think there's a difference between jurisdictional limits, which limited takings claims, and even pleading requirements like the limits to the forms of action, which also limited uh plaintiffs' abilities to bring certain kinds of claims, and the core
question presented here, which is just whether there is an entitlement to relief. There there's only one modern form of action which just takes the shape of saying I'm entitled to this remedy for that reason. The remedy is just compensation, the reason is the Fifth Amendment as applied through the fourteenth. And once the jurisdictional problems and the pleading problems are removed, as they have been in this case, the only question remains whether the Fifth Amendment mandates compensation, whether it mandates that remedy, which this court has already answered. First English says that the just compensation remedy is mandatory. And I think contrasting the r the arguments of the other side with the rule adopted by the California Supreme Court in Aigens is actually a useful illustration here.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Aegens said, we as a common law court don't want to recognize a claim for just compensation in a regulatory takings case.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central question about the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause in Devillier v. Texas?
0:00–6:59
2
How do the parties argue whether the Fifth Amendment creates a federal cause of action for just compensation?
6:59–12:15
3
Why does jurisdiction matter, and how might Congress change it under the Tucker Act?
12:15–21:12
4
What is Texas’s position on using a state cause of action versus a federal takings claim?
21:12–30:43
5
How do the parties differentiate between injunctions, damages, and just‑compensation remedies?
30:43–38:39
6
What would happen if a state refused to pay compensation—could an injunction force payment?
38:39–46:39
7
How does the procedural history of removal and remand affect the remaining claims?
46:39–59:15
8
What are the parties’ final arguments on whether the Fifth Amendment mandates a monetary remedy?
59:15–1:11:54