Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA (24-7)

argument 24-7

Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA

Supreme Court of the United States 1h 4m 7 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 1 month ago official recording ↗

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What is the EPA waiver and how does it affect California’s vehicle emissions standards?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We will hear argument this morning in case twenty four seven Diamond Alternative Energy versus the Environmental Protection Agency. Mr Wall? Mr.

Unknown 0:10

Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The EPA waiver here allows California to limit the number of vehicles that run on liquid fuel. Petitioners make and sell liquid fuel, so vacating the waiver would redress their injuries in two ways. First, as Justice Kavanaugh explained in Energy Future Coalition, Part of the injury in a case like this one is the denial even to compete in the marketplace. Vacating the waiver redresses that injury perfectly. Indeed, it's the only thing that can. Second, even setting aside that clear rule, this court recognized in Department of Commerce that litigants may rely on common sense inferences about third party behavior. It doesn't take much common sense to figure out that if California limits the number of cars that can run on gas, automakers will make fewer cars that run on gas.

Unknown 0:58

Remember that we're here because California asked for and EPA granted a waiver because California said it needs its own standards. California e even intervened by telling the court below that its standards are likely to reduce fuel consumption. The common sense inference is that this waiver matters in the real world, not that it is completely meaningless. But if we needed hard evidence, we had plenty of it, five kinds. One, our declaration showing that California's standards have historically harmed us. to California's and EPA's actions and statements in twenty twenty one and twenty twenty two saying that their standards are likely to reduce fuel consumption. Three, California's two expert declarations from Carb officials in twenty twenty two saying that their standards are likely to decrease fuel consumption.

Unknown 1:47

Four, the intervening automakers' admission that without the waiver, some of their competitors were likely to back away from electrification. And fifth, Toyota's comment and public reporting also indicating that some automakers would back away from electrification without the waiver. Taken together, that is more than enough evidence to establish redressability. I welcome the Court's questions.

Clarence Thomas 2:08

Uh Mr Wallett's taking a step away uh back from the uh evidence you just provided or the point you just made. What is your rule? How would you articul articulate your categorical rule?

Unknown 2:20

Our rule is that when the government denies uh a party the ability to compete in a marketplace that and the party sues to have that market restriction lifted, there is redressability because the party is asking for the thing to be taken away that's causing its injury.

Clarence Thomas 2:37

Is there some degree of hindrance to that party that has to be shown to apply your rule?

Unknown 2:42

I don't think so, because we are not talking about just uh sort of some indirect impediment. I am talking about a market restriction that directly tilts or forecloses the playing field. It says you can't sell your product, your good, your service into a particular market. Uh either wholly or here partially, up to some certain cap.

Clarence Thomas 3:00

So how would you show that?

Unknown 3:02

Well What I'd say is it's it's You show it by the nature of the injury. So just like in a competitor standing case, like in National Credit Union, if you come in and you say the government is under regulating one of my competitors, right, this court said that's competitor standing. Government agrees with that. That's footnote two of their brief. This is the same thing. It's just that instead of picking winning and winners and losers among particular market participants, you're picking winners and losers as among markets. So if you come in and you say, I have something that yesterday I could freely sell, and today I cannot freely sell it as a result of a government regulation that directly forecloses me, you have standing on our view.

Ketanji Brown Jackson 3:38

So, Mr. Wall, how how is that consistent with the courts holding in Worth versus Selden? I know you talk about it. briefly in one of your footnotes, but that seems to me to map on exactly with what you're now saying.