Dietz v. Bouldin (15-458)

argument 15-458

Dietz v. Bouldin

Supreme Court of the United States 52 min 5 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 5 days ago official recording ↗
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What is the central legal question about a district court’s authority to recall discharged jurors?

John G. Roberts 0:00
We'll hear argument next in case fifteen four fifty eight Dietz versus Boulden. Mr Shamagam?
Unknown 0:05
Thank you, Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. When a judge discharges a jury after it reaches a verdict, the jury's service is at an end, and the jurors return to being ordinary members of the public. This case presents the question whether a district court has inherent authority under Article three of the Constitution to recall discharged jurors for further service in the same case. Here for the purpose of deliberating anew and reaching an entirely different verdict. The answer to that question is no. The established rule at common law forbade the recall of discharged jurors. In numerous respects, the Federal rules of procedure reflect the understanding that a district court's authority ends at the point of discharge.
John G. Roberts 0:49
I thought you had a clear right line rule until I got to page nine of your reply brief. Where you say a jury may remain effectively undischarged despite a judge's pronouncement of discharge. Um There are cases where you agree that if the judge says you're discharged. uh they're not really discharged. And the judge can say, Oh, come on back, I've got something else you've got to do.
Unknown 1:15
Mr. Chief Justice, our rule is clear. It's a rule that a district court lacks the authority to recall discharge jurors. The question that we discuss at page nine of our reply brief is the question of what the definition of a discharge is. And let me offer
John G. Roberts 1:27
it well that's pretty fair. lawyerly. Uh
Unknown 1:33
Thank you, Mr. Chief Doctor.
John G. Roberts 1:36
Uh saying any time you're discharged, it's over. Now, discharge may not meet discharge in every case. Because you recognize that there are cases where the judge says you're discharged, but you would allow them to come back.
Unknown 1:48
And that is simply, Mr. Chief Justice, because we believe the discharge is an act. It's not just a pronouncement. And that's what the vast majority of the lower courts have said. They have said that a jury is discharged when Having been released from service, the jurors have left the judges' presence and control.
John G. Roberts 2:05
Okay, presence and control. Now that's th that that's the key distinction that you have?
Unknown 2:10
Uh that is what lower courts have said and we're certainly comfortable with that distinction. So if they
John G. Roberts 2:14
are still if they're still in the courtroom. He can say, Oh well wait wait, hold up. You've got to come back and do this.
Unknown 2:19
Yes, that is correct.

How do the parties define “discharge” and why does that definition matter for jury recall?

Unknown 2:20
And that is basically the line that's the same thing. What if
John G. Roberts 2:22
they're in the hall outside the courtroom? Nothing's happened, they're all still there.
Unknown 2:26
The hall is outside a judge's presence and control. And the only cases where jurors have been permitted to be recalled outside the courtroom under this standard are cases where the jurors say have gone back to the jury room. And I think it's fair to say under those circumstances that the jurors are no longer are are still within the judge's presence and control. Certainly we don't think that that definition could be stretched to facts like this case, where the jurors have not only left the courtroom, but at least two of the jurors have left the immediate vicinity of the courtroom and it appears from the record as if one of the jurors has left the courthouse altogether.
John G. Roberts 3:03
What they are worried about with the rule about discharge and then bringing them back is that the jurors may have talked to somebody about the case, heard something about it. Uh uh had information that is going to be prejudicial to the defendant that they shouldn't have gotten. Why doesn't it make sense to say, well, y i if they're right out in the hall or you know, down the hall, bring them back in and and ask, just as the judge did here. Have you talked to anybody about the case?
Unknown 3:31
Mr Chief Justice, I think that the courts that have adopted that functional definition of discharge that have looked at discharge as the point at which jurors have separated or dispersed. have focused on the potential for influence, not the fact of influence. In other words, those court courts aren't applying uh aren't engaging in a prejudice inquiry under the guise of def defining discharge.

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