District of Columbia v. Wesby (15-1485)
argument 15-1485District of Columbia v. Wesby
Supreme Court of the United States
55 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the Supreme Court’s practical standard for probable cause in this case?
We'll hear argument first this morning in Case 15-1485, the District of Columbia v. Westby. Mr. Kim.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, probable cause is a practical standard, and thus it accounts for the practical limitations that officers face when making arrest decisions, including their inability to look directly into the minds of suspects offering innocent explanations for suspicious conduct. And so, in a case like this one, with the actus reus established and circumstantial evidence of mens rea that is strong or at least fair, arrest is reasonable and hence constitutional, and more clearly, qualified immunity applies. Let's turn to the totality of the circumstances and consider them from the correct perspective.
Mr. Kim, before you do that, could you clarify the other charges that are in this case, the one relating to disorderly conduct and negligent supervision? Where do they stand? And are they in any way affected by the argument you're making today?
We do not pursue an argument that probable cause existed for disorderly conduct as to negligent supervision. That common law claim fails if there was either probable cause or qualified immunity. That's where they stand, Your Honor. If I may turn back to the totality of the circumstances, my clients responded to neighbors' complaints.
I'm not sure I understood what you just said. Whether we hold on qualified immunity grounds or probable cause grounds, I don't think it affects those claims, does it? No, that's right. So why would our finding a probable cause affect it? I think those stand on their own, don't they?
No, Your Honor. If there was probable cause that negligent supervision would fail as a matter of law, that was undisputed in the courts below and it's undisputed in this Court.
Well, we'll let your adversary answer that.
Thank you, Your Honor. So my clients responded to a neighbor's complaints about illegal activities in a house in their residential community that was supposed to be vacant. They found a group of late-night partiers, none of whom claimed any right over the home. The homeowner, Mr. Hughes, confirmed
— I'm sorry. Why isn't there a right? Someone invites me into what they claim is their home or their place of living. Isn't that an invitation?
Yes, there was a claim of invitation, Your Honor. I was referring to the absence of any claim of any property right over the home. But yes, there
was a claim. But I don't have a property right when I get invited into someone's home. To be sure, Your Honor. I don't ask to look at their lease. I don't ask for them to establish to my satisfaction or anyone else's their right to be there. I assume if they're there, they can invite me in.
Your Honor, we're not suggesting that there has to be some type of confirmation by any party guest of the inviter's right to invite. What we're saying instead is from the officer's perspective, looking at the totality of the circumstances, there was a fair probability that respondents were trespassing either knowingly or negligently. This is not about whether or not a partygoer needs to confirm an invitation. This is from the officer's perspective. If he has the fair probability of guilt necessary to arrest, a prosecutor later can decide whether to press charges. But there was that fair probability here based on the brutality of the circumstances. So the homeowner had confirmed no one was supposed to be there.
He had not been there to guard against the partygoer's entry. And the house appeared vacant. It confirmed the neighbor's tip that it was supposed to be vacant. It was essentially unfurnished and in disarray. and this is a quote from the arrest report at JA 112, in disarray in a manner consistent with it being a vacant house. It looked like it was being used just for the party, like no one was living there. This is the type of vacant home that trespassers target.
Just to make sure I understand, Mr. Kim, the tip was a neighbor saying that home is supposed to be vacant, and yet there's a party going on. It's not just a neighbor calling and saying there's a very loud party, it's disturbing my sleep.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s practical standard for probable cause in this case?
0:00–5:52
2
How do the facts about the vacant house and neighbor tips shape the probable‑cause analysis?
5:52–11:16
3
Why does the invitation (or lack thereof) matter for determining trespass?
11:16–19:03
4
What role do qualified‑immunity and mens‑rea considerations play in the officers’ liability?
19:03–27:36
5
How did the lower courts handle summary‑judgment arguments and factual disputes?
27:36–34:37
6
What are the Justice’s concerns about socioeconomic differences and policing practices?
34:37–42:03
7
How does the Court evaluate the totality of circumstances versus bright‑line rules?
42:03–48:54
8
What guidance does the Court give on future police conduct in similar party‑house cases?
48:54–55:47