Edwards v. Vannoy (19-5807)
argument 19-5807Edwards v. Vannoy
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 25m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the central constitutional issue presented in Edwards v. Vannoy?
We will hear argument this morning in case nineteen fifty eight oh seven, Edwards versus Vinoy. Mr Beillanger?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. A verdict by eleven is no verdict at all, is a line from the court earlier this year that ended Louisiana's non unanimous jury scheme. On paper, it restored the full breadth of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right to Louisianans. But we need to place the effect of this ruling into perspective. This laudable ruling would only apply to cases then pending or recently adjudicated. It meant nothing to mister Edwards, who is serving a life sentence at Angola for a verdict that would be illegal everywhere else, since Louisiana is the only place that would jail you for natural life on a non unanimous verdict. Ultimately the question before the court is why should the Sixth Amendment mean something less to Mr Edwards?
Members of the Ramos court were divided on how to reconcile the fractured decision in Apadaco with then existing precedent. This division cleared two paths to holding that Ramos applies retroactively under Teague, two paths for providing a remedy to those jailed by a jury scheme we know was morally wrong at its inception and is unconstitutional. For some justices Apadaka was dead on arrival since its deciding votes rationale was foreclosed by precedent. For these justices, Apadaka provided no precedential value, and Ramos is an old rule dictated by president precedent that simply restored the Sixth Amendment's full measure either through the due process clause or the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth Amendment.
For other justices, Apadaka was such a wrongly decided decision that it needed to be explicitly overruled. For these members of the court, Rama should be a watershed rule requiring retroactivity as this restores fairness and accuracy to jury trials in Louisiana. Both paths remedy something we all know to be wrong. Both paths will provide the promise of a fair trial to all Louisianans. Mr. Chief Justice, I'm ready to entertain questions from the court.
Uh thank you, Counsel. Um I I think your biggest hurdle um is uh the court's decision in Dis Distefano uh where we held at the jury trial right itself uh should not be applied retroactively. What what we're talking about here uh is a subordinate uh right uh to a unanimous verdict, uh uh lesser included. Right. Um how d how do you get around uh Di Stefano?
Um there's two considerations I would like to bring to the uh court's attention. Um D Stefano itself was just dealing with the uh judges' ability to make a decision, and as this court noted in Duncan, you cannot say um whether or not necessarily that a judge rendered decision is more or less accurate than a um jury rendered decision. Our case here deals with the inc intricacies of what goes on in the jury room. I will also note that I think the more analogous case, Mr. Chief Justice, is the Brown decision. It too provided the same retroactivity standard that was um incorporated um in Di Stefano which relied heavily on state interest, and that decided to apply the Birch decision retroactively, which um prevented Louisiana from having non unanimous petty juries.
You know, in Ramos um five of us uh uh thought that Apodaka was uh a precedent that was being overruled, and therefore uh it was the most compelling evidence that it was a new rule. Um were those five justices unreasonable?
Well, when we get to the reasonable s ness standard uh of of the jurists, it's an objective um criterion. I think that we can all agree that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury and that we can all agree um that the Bill of Rights are fully incorporated to the states at this point. Normally um the reasonable jurist standard goes hand in hand with being dictated by precedent, but Apadaka was such a bizarre decision that it broke those two hands apart and that's why it is in a unique Universe of one, Mr. Chief Justice.
I think uh particularly given your answer on Di Stefano uh that that you have something of a burden of establishing that the
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central constitutional issue presented in Edwards v. Vannoy?
0:00–4:52
2
How does the Court’s decision in Ramos affect the retroactivity analysis under Teague?
4:52–14:50
3
Why do the parties argue that a unanimous jury is essential for trial accuracy and fairness?
14:50–28:07
4
What empirical evidence is offered about wrongful convictions under non‑unanimous juries?
28:07–41:09
5
How do the racial origins of Louisiana’s non‑unanimous jury scheme influence the legal arguments?
41:09–53:39
6
What impact would applying Ramos retroactively have on the number of new trials in Louisiana and other states?
53:39–1:06:06
7
Why do some Justices consider Ramos a watershed rule while others do not?
1:06:06–1:20:47
8
What is the Court’s ultimate conclusion on the petition and its implications for final convictions?
1:20:47–1:25:54