Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (16-285)
argument 16-285Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 3m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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How does the Court view the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the NLRA in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis?
We'll hear an argument first this term in case sixteen two hundred eighty-five, Epic Systems Corporation versus Lewis and the consolidated cases.
Mr. Clement. Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, respondents claim that arbitration agreements providing for individual arbitration that would otherwise be enforceable under the FAA are nonetheless invalid by operation of another Federal statute. This Court's cases provide a well trod path for resolving such claims. Because of the clarity with which the FAA speaks to enforcing arbitration agreements as written. The FAA will only yield in the face of a contrary congressional command and the tie goes to arbitration. Applying those principles to Section seven of the NLRA, the result is clear that the FAA should not yield.
Is that a concession that this is a concerted action? Well I I don't know that it is a concession that we have. premise for the opinion of the court, uh wouldn't we have to say we assume that this is concerted action under the NLRA section seven, but The FA
Prevailed. Well I think what you would say, Justice Kennedy, is the concerted activity that's protected by Section seven at most gets them to the threshold of the courthouse. But Section seven is directed to the workplace, not the courthouse. And what it protects is their right in the workplace to decide they want to initiate action. But then once they get to the courthouse.
Mr Comment, the Courthouse is not at issue here as I understand it. These employees say We don't object to arbitration. But what we do object to is the one on one. The employee against the employer. and the driving force of the NLRA. Was the recognition Okay. there was an imbalance that there was no true liberty of contract. So that's why they said in the in the N R R E concerted activity is to be protected against employee employer interference.
That's right, Justice Ginsburg, but it's collective action by the employees in the workplace. And then once they get to their forum, be it the board itself
is the NLR A say in the workplace. It says for the mutual benefit mutual benefit and protection, mutual aid. Right.
It it it doesn't say in the workplace. I'm just saying that's where it's directed and in every context.
I'm sorry, I think that's a good question. Well why is it directed there if it doesn't say that? I mean in fact we said the opposite in East Tech. We said uh employees seeking to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums, essentially the legislatures and the courthouses, uh and the agencies, is covered by the Mutual Aid or Protection Clause. So, you know, in East Tech's we came up against this question, said it was very clear that the mutual aid or protection clause swept further than the workplace itself. It as long as the ultimate goals were workplace related, whether you took those goals To the in the w you know in activity in the workplace or in the agencies or in the courts, it didn't matter at all.
It was all covered by Section seven.
That's right, Justice Kagan, but the c the keywords there are resort to. There's no right in Section seven or anywhere else in the NLRA to proceed as a class once you get there. Well that isn't
the issue, is it? I mean uh at least to me. And you can explain this. You started out saying this is an arbitration case. I don't know that it is. I thought these contracts would provi for pri would forbid joint action. Which could be just two people joining a case. Injudicial. as well as arbitration forums. Regardless, I'm worried about what you're saying is overturning Labour law that goes back to for FDR at least, the entire heart of the New Deal. What we have here is a statute two of them, Norris LaGuardia, the NLRA, which for years have been interpreted the way Justice Kagan said. They say that they protect the Joint. Joining together those are the words. Joining together, those are the words of our interpretation of you could have two workers.
to seek to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
How does the Court view the conflict between the Federal Arbitration Act and the NLRA in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis?
0:01–7:37
2
What is the significance of “concerted activity” under Section 7 of the NLRA for arbitration agreements?
7:37–15:01
3
Can employees pursue a class‑action in arbitration when their contract limits collective claims?
15:01–22:46
4
How do the parties interpret the “savings clause” of the FAA in relation to labor‑law protections?
22:46–30:23
5
What role do the NLRB’s historical rulings play in determining the enforceability of bilateral arbitration agreements?
30:23–38:19
6
Do confidentiality or “yellow‑dog” clauses in employment contracts violate Section 7 and Section 8 of the NLRA?
38:19–48:20
7
How might arbitration‑forum rules (e.g., numerosity, typicality) affect employees’ ability to act collectively?
48:20–56:10
8
What are the practical implications for employers and employees if the Court strikes down class‑arbitration restrictions?
56:10–1:02:59