Evans v. Michigan (11-1327)
argument 11-1327Evans v. Michigan
Supreme Court of the United States
57 min
5 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 4 days ago
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What is the Supreme Court’s longstanding rule on judge‑made acquittals and double jeopardy?
We'll hear argument next in case eleven thirteen twenty seven Evans versus Michigan. Mr. Moran.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court, along an unbroken line of this court's precedent stand for the principle that a judge's final determination that a defendant is not guilty is a final determination of an acquittal for for double jeopardy purposes, even if that determination is wrong as a matter of law or as a matter of fact. And even if
we give credence to how the judge labels what the acquittal is?
No. No. This court must determine whatever it's labeled, what has the judge done? Has the judge made a determination that the government has failed to prove its case, as in Martin Lennon, or has the gov or has the judge made a determination of something else, as in Scott, for example, pretrial delay?
determines, quite erroneously, that uh it has to be a dwelling. Mid mid midway during the trial, I'm the judge. I consider this has to be a dwelling. Um is there any way I can make that point, make that ruling without invoking double jeopardy?
Well you could reserve that ruling to the end of the case. Uh you could make a ruling as to the jury instructions without or what the jury instructions are going to be without applying them to the facts of the case, in other words, without making a determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence.
But if I persist in that view. There's nothing the government can do.
The government can try, we learned from Smith, try to get you to reconsider that view before the defendant puts on his case. But once the defendant once the judge has made a final determination that the defendant is not guilty, even on an erroneous view of the law, this court has held multiple times that that is a final determination, that is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.
Because I suppose the judge is the government too.
Exactly.
So whether the unfairness uh inheres in the prosecution or in the judge, uh the the guy's been treated
unfairly. If a state chooses, Justice Scalia, to vest acquittal power in its judges, it must accept the double jeopardy consequences of that.
Even when the defendant interjected this issue and we the defendant uh urged the judge to make this incorrect notion that you have to negate The higher crime. in order to convict of the lesser crime. It was the defendant that led the the trial judge into error. The trial judge didn't come up with this on his own.
The judge came up with this, Your Honor, on defendant's motion, that's correct. But it was actually supported by the jury instructions that were in use. And actually it was supported by the structure of the statutes in question. The statute in question under which Mr. Evans was charged explicitly said that the building other than one specified in the preceding subsection.
But you're not arguing that that was the correct charge that No, we're
preclude it now from arguing that that's correct.
Anyway, counsel often uh uh encouraged judges to do the wrong thing. In fact, in every case there's there's one of the two counsel urging the court to do the wrong thing, right? Yes,
Justice Scalia and
that that's what the adversary system consists of.
Yes, and in Santa Brea this court noted that point exactly that uh all acquittals, whether they're by the judge or by the jury, uh or I should say almost all acquittals, some are suicontinate. Almost all acquittals, whether by judge or by jury, are upon invitation of defense counseling. Could
a state provide a procedure where uh if a judge makes a critical ruling mid trial uh that at the request of the opposing counsel, jury proceedings are suspended for forty eight hours and the aggrieved party can run to the Court of Appeals to get a mandate.
I don't think the state could do that, Justice Kennedy, because of Smailus.
Because of
Smailus. So that was essentially the situation in Smailus. You had a bench trial, the judge grants a demure, he says the evidence is insufficient, and then the prosecution attempted to run to the Pennsylvania appellate court, and this court said
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the Supreme Court’s longstanding rule on judge‑made acquittals and double jeopardy?
0:01–7:22
2
How do mid‑trial directed verdicts by a judge raise double‑jeopardy concerns?
7:22–15:12
3
When does a judge’s ruling on insufficient evidence count as an acquittal?
15:12–22:26
4
What distinction does the Court draw between mis‑constructing an element and adding a new element to a crime?
22:26–28:34
5
How have cases like Martin Lennon, Scott, Smailus, and Smith shaped the double‑jeopardy analysis?
28:34–35:16
6
Can a state limit or eliminate a judge’s power to grant mid‑trial acquittals?
35:16–42:14
7
What are the arguments for and against treating bench‑trial verdicts the same as jury verdicts under the Double Jeopardy Clause?
42:14–50:08
8
Should the Court revisit its historic double‑jeopardy line of cases to address modern procedural issues?
50:08–57:22