FCC v. Consumers' Research (24-354)
argument 24-354FCC v. Consumers' Research
Supreme Court of the United States
2h 33m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 1 month ago
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Transcript
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What are the key principles of Section 254 that limit the FCC’s delegation of authority?
We will hear argument this morning in case twenty four three fifty four, Federal Communications Commission versus Consumers Research and the Consolidated Case. General Harris?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Section two hundred and fifty four is no delegation running riot. Congress first told the FCC what policy to follow to give all Americans access to basic telecommunication services at reasonable charges, i.e. universal service. So FCC can promote phone service but not faxes. Second, Congress said how to do it by charging carriers a fee, then reimbursing carriers that serve universal service programmes. Third, Congress dictated how much to charge, only what's sufficient to achieve universal service, so no more than needed to support specified programs. Fourth, Congress prescribed how to allocate fees. They must be equitable and nondiscriminatory, so FCC can't charge by carrier size or revenue.
Fifth, Congress detailed what underserved areas FCC must target low income, rural, insular and high cost areas, plus schools, libraries and healthcare providers. On top of that, Congress enacted two hundred and fifty four against the backdrop of a half century history where FCC advanced universal service through rate subsidies. That delegation leaves key policy choices to Congress and is definite and precise enough for courts to tell if FCC followed Congress's limits when filling in details. Indeed, this scheme resembles the pipeline safety fee in Skinner, which this court deemed an easy case. Like in Skinner, respondents do not ask this court to revisit precedents approving far broader delegations.
Respondents instead press a special non delegation rule for taxes, the very rule Skinner rejected. Respondents' private nondelegation challenge likewise fails. They challenge FCC's reliance on USAC to calculate Carrier's proposed contribution fee. But FCC itself reviews, publishes, and adopts the fee for it to take effect. That is a basic delegation of accounting tasks, not grounds for the Magna Carta. I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh do any of the uh principles that you just listed apply to the revenue raising uh activities of the uh uh of the FCC?
All of the principles I identified apply to them. Well all of the principles I identified apply to them in that it's a a sort of unitary scheme in which the FCC is constrained and not raising more than is sufficient to support specified programs. So under the Fifth Circuit's elenco decision, which we agree with. FCC can't just say, wouldn't it be nice to have a rainy day fund where there's an additional ten billion dollars lying around. It has to be sp teed to the specific universal program service programs that have been um in existence and that Congress prescribed for the FCC to pursue.
uh how does that constrain the uh revenue raising?
It constrains the revenue raising because it has to be sufficient. Congress uses that word three times in different parts of the statute in two fifty four D, two fifty four E, and also in um two fif uh in also in B five. And sufficient means it can't be again excessive. It and that's what the Fifth Circuit decision that we agree with is saying. So again If the programs are running at a particular rate, which they have been for the last ten years, con uh the FCC can't just turn around and say, why don't we charge more? Why don't we put more why don't we why don't we make the carriers uh pay more of a fee? And on uh so that is a real limit, it's a qualitative limit, and it is the type of limit. that is common throughout statutory schemes.
Uh we cite a number of other ones at a reply brief at pages eight to nine where each where various agencies and indeed this court are allowed to ch are are allowed to charge reasonable fees uh which is construed in against the backdrop of the statutory schemes.
Can you um do you have any uh examples of fees uh that did not have a monetary limit or taxes that did not have uh monetary limits uh that were imposed either by agencies or by Congress.
Well yes, again, all of the ones on pages eight to nine are examples of that.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What are the key principles of Section 254 that limit the FCC’s delegation of authority?
0:00–14:14
2
How does the Court’s questioning shift to the constraints on the FCC’s revenue‑raising powers?
14:14–46:19
3
Why do the parties debate whether the scheme is a tax or a fee and what does that mean for non‑delegation?
46:19–1:04:31
4
Can universal service be expanded to include things like nationwide cell‑phone plans or Starlink?
1:04:31–1:21:12
5
Why do the speakers argue that Congress should set a clear policy or cap for the Universal Service Fund?
1:21:12–1:37:45
6
How do the parties explain the agency’s authority to set contribution rates and the limits of that authority?
1:37:45–2:05:31
7
What is the significance of distinguishing a tax from a fee and how might a numerical cap resolve the non‑delegation issue?
2:05:31–2:26:43
8
What are the potential consequences of a ruling and how might relief be limited to the named parties?
2:26:43–2:33:18