Fernandez v. California (12-7822)
argument 12-7822Fernandez v. California
Supreme Court of the United States
58 min
7 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 5 days ago
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What is the doctrine of third‑party consent and how does it shape police entry?
We'll hear argument next today in case twelve seven eight two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two two Fernandez versus California. Mr Fisher.
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the court. The doctrine of third party consent is best understood as establishing a rebuttable presumption. When the police arrive at a house at which multiple people live, they can assume, according to social custom, that if one person grants consent to enter, that person is speaking for everybody who lives in a dwelling. But when somebody is present and tells the police officer that he refuses consent, that presumption is reversed. Then when the police full well know that one person doesn't have the delegated authority to speak for the others, they must respect the objection, and a failure to do so violates the Fourth Amendment. In other words, MATLOC already gives the police all of the benefit of the doubt.
Even when people are nearby and have a in might have an interest in objecting, The police can assume is this put qu is this court put it in Randolph that asking that other person wouldn't make a difference very often and therefore they can presume that they would also consent to the search.
So all were may maybe I should put to you at the outset the problem, the case that's bothering me. Neighbors hear a noise. Police come to the door. Man and wife are there. She, as in this case, has a bump on her nose, holding a baby and is crying and blood on her shirt. The police, for whatever set of reasons, arrest the husband. The woman says Mr Policeman. I would like you to come in the House. I'd like you to look at a couple of the clauses. I'm worried about what's in them. I can't quite tell you what it is. I dunno. But I'd like you to look through the house. Is that woman Never to be able to get a policeman in the house. Never. I mean Months go by. Uh is she owns the house too? And by the way, I have tried to keep out of my hypothetical any other basis for getting in.
It's not a she's not a danger. The husband's gone. She is uh uh Uh no destruction of evidence, she won't destroy it. Um you see and and so that is i she owns the house. Can she never invite the policeman in?
Uh she can invite them in, uh Justice Breyer, and the police within about fifteen minutes can get a warrant and come right in and get the money. On the what
basis?
Pardon me?
On what basis?
On the basis that I think that you've just described that she's not. No, she says, I don't know
what's in the closet, mister Policeman. I don't know that it has anything to do with my bloody nose. I just would like you to take a look around. See, I tried to keep out probable cause. I've tried to eliminate any other basis. And that's what is worrying me on worry stemming from. But it's her house too. Can't she invite people into her house too, whom she wants, including the policeman? Now that's the example that got me to write separately in the other case. That's the example that keeps gnawing on my mm mind. Address it.
Well Justice Breyer, I've never seen a case like that, but there'd be two things I would say if one arose. Uh one is, under Coolidge under the Coolidge case, she could simply go get the things in the closet and give it to the police officer. And that would take care of the problem, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his separate opinion in Randolph. Uh In addition, uh she may well be able to invite the police into the dwelling sometimes, but that's very different than what's going on here.
I don't want a policeman to set foot in my house. And it's not just the closet. She wants the police to take a good look around. Well
no, I'm sorry, then I misunderstood. In that case, it would violate the Fourth Amendment for the police to come in. But I think the hypotheticals that one might think of and that can arise is certainly what the other side have pointed out in the brief, leave out three very important things that I think you need to ask under the Fourth Amendment social customs analysis. The first is you need to remember that we're asking about whether a stranger because the police officer can step into the shoes of what a stranger would be allowed to do.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the doctrine of third‑party consent and how does it shape police entry?
0:01–6:19
2
How does the hypothetical involving a battered wife illustrate the consent issue?
6:19–14:07
3
What does Randolph say about a co‑tenant’s objection and physical presence?
14:07–22:40
4
How do the parties argue about the police removing the objecting tenant?
22:40–29:04
5
When can a present co‑tenant give valid consent despite an absent objector?
29:04–35:10
6
What practical solutions (lockboxes, private spaces) are proposed for protecting privacy?
35:10–41:40
7
How do the justices weigh exigent circumstances versus obtaining a warrant?
41:40–49:39
8
What is the final ruling on whether Fernandez’s Fourth Amendment rights survive his arrest?
49:39–58:53