Fischer v. United States (23-5572)
argument 23-5572Fischer v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 40m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 8 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What is the legal issue at stake in Fischer v. United States?
We will hear argument this morning in case twenty three fifty five seventy two, Fisher
versus United States. Mr. Green? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Congress enacted fifteen twelve C. in two thousand and two in the wake of the large scale destruction of Enron's financial documents. The statute therefore prohibits the impairment of the integrity or availability of of information and evidence to be used in a proceeding. In two thousand and two, Congress hedged a little bit and added Section C two to cover other forms of impairment, the known unknowns, so to speak. It was, after all, the dawn of the information age. Until the january sixth prosecutions Section fifteen twelve C two, the otherwise provision, had never been used to prosecute anything other than evidence tampering.
And that was for good reason. This court has said that otherwise when used in a criminal statute means to do similar conduct in a different way. The government would have you ignore all that or disregard all that and instead convert C two from a catch all provision into a dragnet. One of the things that that dragnet would cover is section C one. Our construction of the statute at least leaves C one and C two to do some independent work. The January sixth prosecutions demonstrate that there are a host of felony and misdemeanor crimes that cover the alleged conduct. A Sarbanes Oxley based Enron driven evidence tampering statute is not one of them. I welcome the Court's question.
Uh Mr Green, wha how do we determine what uh these two provisions have in common? Uh do we look after the otherwise or before and why?
We l you look at before Justice Thomas and you look at uh the kinds of manner in which uh documents and records are to be uh impaired, uh and then you look after to see what the effect is, but I would submit that the effect is the same. Right, in order to uh cause uh the impairment of the integrity of the evidence that's to be used in a proceeding or to uh prevent its availability. So we look back and we look forward.
Uh d w is wouldn't it be just as easy to look at C at the uh C two and then ask what it has in common uh w with C one and use uh C two's uh provisions as the basis for that similarity?
No, because in in in C two speaks to the effect of the actions that the otherwise clause covers. So in other words, we look at C one and we see that Congress is concerned about documents and records and other objects and things that are done to those to impair the integrity of those. And the effect of that uh is to obstruct. And so C two omits that object and verb section.
Uh but you could just as easily say that Congress is really concerned about uh things that obstruct, influence, or impede official proceedings. And that's C two. So uh why isn't that the basis for the similarity?
Well, because of the of the the presence of the otherwise provision. So uh otherwise, as I mentioned in and th otherwise this court has said, means to do similar conduct in a different way. So what we've got here is is the impairment of evidence being done in a different way.
I I thought was, yes, doing it in a different way. So let me give you an example. Um their is a a sign on the theatre. You will be kicked out of the theatre if you photograph or record the actors. or otherwise disrupt the performance. If you start yelling I think no one would question that you can be expected to be kicked out under this policy. even though yelling has nothing to do with photograph or recording. The object that the verb is looking at the verbs are looking at is the obstruction. It's not the manner in which you obstruct It's the fact that you've obstructed Isn't that the structure of this provision?
It is, Your Honor. It it's it's in part the structure of the provision. But what what your hypothetical um omits is that there is a specific retriculation, I guess it's called, of all of the different sorts of things that might be done to evidence to begin with. Except with long
what's fascinating about one, which is not about two. is that one doesn't require you to have actually impeded
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the legal issue at stake in Fischer v. United States?
0:00–12:41
2
How do sections 1512(c)(1) and 1512(c)(2) differ in defining obstruction?
12:41–24:36
3
Why does the government argue that the word “otherwise” creates a broad catch‑all provision?
24:36–35:51
4
What examples does counsel give to illustrate the scope of §1512(c)(2)?
35:51–49:22
5
How do intent, corrupt intent, and the nexus requirement affect liability under §1512(c)(2)?
49:22–1:02:58
6
Can minimal or peaceful protests fall within the statute’s prohibitions?
1:02:58–1:15:51
7
What are the sentencing ranges and penalties associated with a §1512(c)(2) conviction?
1:15:51–1:28:42
8
What conclusion does the Court seek regarding the interpretation of §1512(c)(2)?
1:28:42–1:40:34