Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington (10-945)
argument 10-945Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 3m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
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What is the central legal issue being argued in Florence v. Burlington County?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case ten nine four five, Florence versus the Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington. Mr Goldstein?
Mr Chief Justice, may it please the court. We ask this court to hold that a jail may strip search an arrestee in cases of reasonable suspicion. That is the rule that was applied throughout almost the entire country in the three decades after Bell versus Wolfish without either administrative difficulty or any apparent increase in smuggling. We're here today, of course, because both the Burlington Jail and the Essex County Jail require every arrestee to stand two feet in front of a correctional officer and strip naked.
Do you p apply the reasonable suspicion rule? to all arrestees? I thought you were making a distinction between felons and less serious offenders.
We do apply it to all arrestees. The respondents in the US Bureau of Prisons do draw a line at uh major versus minor offenders. I think they do that. Because they think that uh people who commit more serious crimes might be inclined to greater criminality. But our rule is one of reasonable suspicion. Th our question presented draws a line at minor offenders because this class definition is only people who were arrested for minor offenders.
Is the reasonable suspicion uh test more easily met if it's a f felon uh detained for a serious felony?
Uh it is uh in the view of the courts that have considered this question absolutely
Well then you then you are going on a case by case basis based on the offense.
Uh the categor there is a categorical rule and that is that was adopted by these respondents by the Bureau of Prisons and four courts of appeals that says if you were arrested for a more serious offense, categorically there exists reasonable suspicion. Our case by case rule, it's true, uh applies with respect to minor offenders. And again, that's the class that was uh Well how
would this work uh with respect to uh individuals who have been arrested for serious offences. Let's say someone has been arrested for um uh for assault. Uh Let's say it's a case of domestic violence, assault. Would that be enough to justify search.
I I think you will have to ask I I know you want me to answer the question. Let me just be very clear. This is their rule. The respondents draw the major minor offense line. The respondents apply a reasonable suspicion standard. Now in my
I understand. You say that you don't want to draw that line, you want to apply it to to everybody. And I'm asking you uh whether the f the mere fact that someone has been arrested for a violent offense would, in your judgment, be sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion.
If the jail made that judgment, we would think that a court would not overturn that judgment. We think that illustrates that by contrast, when someone is arrested for not paying a fine. that there is no justification whatsoever because the logic of their own policy is that this is a person who's inclined to violence. But I take
I take it what we're trying to do is to protect the individual dignity of the detainee. uh but it seems to me that you risk compromising uh that individual dignity if you say we have reasonable suspicion as to you, but not as to you. You're just setting us up. Uh and you're setting the D Tanee up for a classification. that may be questioned at the time and will be seen as an affront based on the person's race, uh based on what he said or she said to the officers coming in. So it it it seems to me that your rule uh imperls individual dignity in a in a way That the blanket rule does not.
Well, uh a couple of points, Justice Kennedy, I think it's an incredibly important issue. They don't have a blanket rule. Remember, the respondents apply a reasonable suspicion standard. They do strip everyone naked, but if they're gonna look for contraband, that is, look at the person's mouth look at their anus, they apply a reasonable suspicion standard. Now to your very serious concern that maybe we're inviting uh discrimination, or at least an appearance of discrimination, remember that their rule is going to produce more of that problem than ours, because their rule is not that they have to strip sear they have to strip search everyone for contraband, but their rule is they can.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central legal issue being argued in Florence v. Burlington County?
0:02–7:28
2
How do the parties define and apply the “reasonable suspicion” standard for strip searches?
7:28–16:06
3
What distinguishes a visual body‑cavity search from a simple strip search under the Fourth Amendment?
16:06–23:23
4
How do Burlington and Essex jail policies differ on inmate searches and why does that matter?
23:23–31:02
5
What constitutional arguments are raised about individual dignity versus jail security?
31:02–39:46
6
What empirical evidence do the parties present about contraband detection and its relevance?
39:46–46:51
7
Why does the Court consider deference to prison officials and a blanket search policy appropriate?
46:51–55:11
8
What are the final positions of the parties and the question the Court must resolve?
55:11–1:03:18