Fowler v. United States (10-5443)

argument 10-5443

Fowler v. United States

Supreme Court of the United States 55 min 6 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 6 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central legal question in Fowler v. United States?

John G. Roberts 0:01

We'll hear argument next this morning in case ten five four four four four four four four three Fowler versus United States. Uh Mr Crawford.

Cameron N. Crawford 0:11

Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. There is a significant disagreement between the circuit court over what the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. To establish the violation of Title eighteen United States Code Section fifteen twelve A one C. This death qualifying federal criminal statute must be construed clearly. consistently and narrowly. Yet the eleventh circuit's opinion in this case conflicts with the rulings in factually similar cases from the Second Circuit Lopez and the Fifth Circuit Causey and other Circuit President.

Antonin Scalia 0:47

Are they all consistent?

Cameron N. Crawford 0:50

It would be our opinion they are all inconsistent uh which is uh what we need from this court, Your Honor. The eleventh circuit aired by placing the word possible in the statute. and thus significantly modifying the plain language of the statute. And by proposing a standard of mere possibility.

Anthony M. Kennedy 1:08

Mr. Crawford, what's your standard? Uh sometimes you say certain, sometimes you say likely, sometimes you say plausible. Which which is your standard?

Cameron N. Crawford 1:19

Justice Kagan, we would offer the standard of realistic likelihood. which we cited in our brief on page seventeen and page forty one as the appropriate standard in this particular case. That is language that comes from Lopez, the Second Circuit case, and also places a higher burden on the government, which we believe is important in order to maintain the federal state balance that is required in federal criminal matters. It is a reasonable standard uh More reasonable than what we would characterise the governors the government standard of reasonable possible. In their brief page nine, ten and thirteen, they proposed that, which we would add differs from what the eleventh circuit said. If you'll remember in Lopez the Eleventh Circuit offered the standard possible

Cameron N. Crawford 2:05

And yet the government Backing away from that a bit, in their briefs on page nine, ten and thirteen use the phrase reasonably possible. And while we would concede it as an improvement on the eleventh circuit's mere possibility standard, It still is vague. It still upset us.

Samuel A. Alito 2:22

speaks of the intent of the defendant. The defendant must intend to prevent the communication of information about a federal offense or a possible federal offense to a law enforcement officer who happens to be a federal law enforcement officer. So it's all a matter of intent. Where do you get the this question of whether it's possible or likely or or certain or whatever that the information will eventually get to a federal law enforcement officer. Isn't it ev isn't it simply what is in the mind of the defendant?

Cameron N. Crawford 2:55

We believe that subsection G of the statute precludes the uh or takes the mens re element of the defendant off the table with respect to uh... whether or not the person is a law enforcement official or whether or not there's an ongoing federal criminal investigation. We would agree with you. that the law does require that the defendant intend to prevent a communication. The eleventh circuit puts the word possible in there and says intent to prevent a possible communication. And that's the rub, Justice Alito, that uh we're asking this court to address.

Elena Kagan 3:29

Um going going back to Justice Alito's question. Obviously the statute's not written to say um Uh the intent to preclude a witness from talking to law enforcement officials. If it were that simple about a federal crime, then it wouldn't matter whether it was likely, possible. All that we had a the know is that the that the witness was that the killing was intended to stop them from talking to law enforcement, period. So clearly G has to have a meaning different than merely stopping some from someone talking to a law enforcement officer. Cause there has to be some connection to that officer being a federal officer. So going back to Justice Algero's question, how do you define the intent? What is the defendant's intent?

Elena Kagan 4:24

If he doesn't have to know it's a federal officer, what does he have