Garland, Att'y Gen. v. Gonzalez (20-322)
argument 20-322Garland, Att'y Gen. v. Gonzalez
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 3m
6 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
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What is the government’s argument about the scope of § 1252 F‑1 and class‑wide injunctive relief?
Mr. Gannon. Mr. Chief Justice, it may it please the court. With respect to the original question presented, if the court reaches it in this case, the government's position is, as Mr. Raynor has just explained in the first case this morning. Section twelve thirty one A six does not compel the bond hearing regime imposed by the Ninth Circuit any more than the Third Circuit after the removal period, not as a matter of the statute's text, nor as a matter of constitutional avoidance. With respect to the additional question, the courts below could not enter class wide injunctive relief because in section twelve fifty two F one, Congress has expressly limited the lower courts' jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of certain provisions of the INA, including those governing post order custody.
That limitation applies regardless of the nature of the action or claim, so it is not limited to constitutional challenges, and any such limit would only encourage plaintiffs to do what happened here seek to avoid the bar by advancing implausible statutory constructions under the guise of constitutional avoidance. Moreover, the statute's exception for orders granting relief to an individual alien against whom removal proceedings have been initiated does not permit class wide relief simply because every current or future member of a class could have qualified for individual relief. That would be inconsistent with Congress's concern about allowing lower courts to remake the immigration system under readings that have not been adopted by this court.
And this court has stated as much about the exception in twelve fifty two F one three times, most recently in Jennings, as the Third Circuit recognized i in its decision two weeks ago in Brito. I welcome the court's questions. Mr. Ganning, as I understand your jurisdictional argument, it really all relies on The idea that enjoying That means both stop and require. Is that correct? It it depends on that with respect to enjoin uh separately if the if the question of putting aside the uh individual issue. No, even setting aside the the exception i if if you just said that it means um that we have to enforce the statute. If you go to their second argument that the the argument that the court said below, that the operation of the provisions means um
that we can't be compelled to do this we can be compelled to do the statute, uh that would still be um compulsion under that's the way we read that. Yes. Okay. Yes. Okay. Um so I'm just going to uh I mean i i uh of course you're right that if you look up uh the word adjoin in the dictionary you can find something that s suggests not stop, but something like order or require or something like that. But I'm just looking at this uh phrase. um uh enjoin or restrain the operation of certain statutory provisions. And let me let me give you some examples. about what the word enjoined would mean in similar phrases. The plaintiff seeks to enjoin enforcement of the law. Does that mean stop? I I think it's hard to tell from that context whether it means that they seek to have the law enforced.
If the plaintiff seeks to enforce the law as opposed to the plaintiff seeks to enjoin enforcement of the law, doesn't that obviously mean stop enforcement? No. If the plaintiff is saying you are not enforcing the law, I want an injunction that says enforce the law, then the plaintiff would be asking for someone to be enjoyed to enforce the law.
The plaintiff seeks to enjoin Uh excuse me, the agency seeks to enjoin the aiding and abetting of securities law violations. In that context, I think it's clear that the agency is trying to stop Something that it would be it would consider to be a violation of the law. The federal court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin state court proceedings. I I think that they could neither compel state court proceedings nor stop state court proceedings. That's who that is. Just like really? Either one?
And I think that means that they can't order collection of taxes anymore. more than it says that you could that they can order the stopping of collection of state tax.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the government’s argument about the scope of § 1252 F‑1 and class‑wide injunctive relief?
0:04–7:47
2
How do the Justices interpret the meaning of “enjoin” and “restrain” in the immigration statute?
7:47–15:16
3
Why does the Court distinguish between an injunction that stops a statute and one that merely restrains its implementation?
15:16–21:54
4
What constitutional due‑process concerns arise from prolonged detention without a bond hearing?
21:54–29:58
5
How does the Court address the “individual alien” exception and its impact on class actions?
29:58–38:01
6
What role do independent decision‑makers play in determining flight risk or danger to the community?
38:01–46:15
7
Why do the parties argue over whether the statute requires a bond hearing before six months of detention?
46:15–54:54
8
What are the final positions of the Government and the Petitioners on the merits of the case?
54:54–1:03:35