Gonzalez v. Google LLC (21-1333)
argument 21-1333Gonzalez v. Google LLC
Supreme Court of the United States
2h 40m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 7 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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Transcript generated automatically by AI and may contain errors.
What statutory distinctions does the Court’s argument begin with?
We'll hear argument this morning in case twenty one thirteen thirty three, Gonzalez versus Google. Mr Schnapper?
Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the court. Section two hundred C one distinguishes between claims that seek to hold An internet company liable for content created by someone else and claims based on the company's own conduct. That distinction is drawn in each of the three sections of the statute. First, Section two hundred and thirty C one is limited to claims that would treat the defendant as a publisher of third party content. The statute uses published in the common law sense. The Fourth Circuit decision in Henderson correctly interprets the statute in that manner and concludes it involves two elements. The claim must be based on the action of the defendant in disseminating third party content and the harm must arise from the content itself.
Second, Section two hundred thirty one two hundred thirty C one is limited to publication of information provided by another content provider, which is often referred to as third party content. The statutory defense doesn't apply insofar as a claim is based on words written by the defendant or other content created by the defendant. In some circumstances, the manner in which third party content is organized or presented could convey other information from the defendant itself, as the government notes. Third, Section two hundred and thirty C one only applies insofar as a defendant was acting as an internet Um uh computer service. Most entities that are Internet computer services do other things as well.
This court technically is an interactive Uh computer service, because of its website, it does other things as it is doing today. Conduct that falls outside that line of activity is outside the scope of the statute. A number of the briefs in this case urge the Court to adopt a general rule that things that might be referred to as the recommendation are inherently protected by the statute. a a decision which would require the courts to then uh fashion some judicial definition of recommendation. We think the court should decline that invitation. and should instead focus on interpreting the specific language of the statute. I welcome the Court's questions.
Uh Mr Schnapper Schnapper, um just so we're clear about what we're t uh the the your claim is. Are you saying that Uh YouTube's application of its algorithms is particular to uh in this case uh that they're using a different algorithm that uh to the one that say they're using for cooking uh videos or are they using the same algorithm across the board?
Uh i it's the same algorithm across the board.
So so what is your i if if it's the same algorithm, I think you have to give us a a clearer example of it what your point is exactly. The same algorithm to present cooking videos to people who are interested in cooking uh and uh ISIS videos to people who are interested in ISIS, uh racing videos, to people who are interested in racing. then I think you're going to have to explain more clearly, if it's neutral in that way, how your claim uh uh is set apart from that.
Surely. Um The uh if I might turn to the practice of uh displaying thumbnails, um which is a a a a major part of what's at issue here, the problem and the issue is not the manner in which YouTube displays videos. It actually displays, as you doubtless know from having looked at, these little pictures uh which are referred to as thumbnails. Um they are intended to encourage uh the viewer to click on them and then go see a video. Uh it's the use of algorithms to uh generate these um uh these thumbnails that's at issue. And the thumbnails in turn uh involve us uh involve content created by the defendant.
But it the it's basing the thumbnails, from what I understand, is based upon what the algorithm suggests the uh user is interested in. So if you're interested in cooking, you don't want thumbnails on light jazz. Uh you so the it's it's it's neutral in that sense. You're interested in cooking, say you get interested in rice and pilaf from Uzbekistan.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What statutory distinctions does the Court’s argument begin with?
0:00–11:25
2
How do the parties argue about YouTube thumbnails and recommendation functions?
11:25–26:25
3
Why does the discussion shift to the bookseller analogy and its relevance to immunity?
26:25–48:27
4
What are the three elements of §230 C‑1 and how do they affect the case?
48:27–1:14:29
5
How does the brief illustrate potential employment discrimination through platform algorithms?
1:14:29–1:39:49
6
When does the discussion shift to liability for defamation and the effect of explicit recommendations?
1:39:49–2:13:50
7
What arguments are made about the neutrality of algorithms versus editorial control?
2:13:50–2:35:38
8
How do the parties treat featured or homepage content as a possible exception to Section 230 immunity?
2:35:38–2:40:40