Groff v. DeJoy (22-174)
argument 22-174Groff v. DeJoy
Supreme Court of the United States
1h 47m
8 speakers
8 chapters
transcribed 6 days ago
official recording ↗
Transcript
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What is the central dispute over the “undue hardship” standard in Groff v. DeJoy?
We'll hear argument first this morning in case twenty two one seventy four, Groff versus the Postmaster General, Louis DeJoy. Mr Street?
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Title seven requires religious accommodations, absent and undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. TWA versus Hardison violates the statute's promise that employees should not be forced to choose between their faith and their job. Hardisan's de minimis test makes a mockery of the English language, and no party truly defends it today. Fortunately, Hardison's test is dicta as to Title VII, so the Court can and should construe undue hardship according to its plain text to mean significant difficulty or expense. But even if Hardison applied Title VII, its de minimis test lacks precedential force because it was barely considered by the court and its neutrality based rationale has been devastated by Abercrombie.
The government's new patchwork test is little better than Hardisons. It allows employers to deny accommodations far short of any fair meaning of undue hardship. The government believes undue hardship arises whenever there is lost efficiency, weekly payment of premium wages, or denial of a coworker's shift preference. Thus, under the government's test, a diabetic employee could receive snack breaks under Title VII, under the ADA, but not prayer. Airbreaks under Title VII, for that might cause loss deficiency. An employee could receive weekly leave for pregnancy checkups, but not to attend Mass, for that might require denying a coworker's shift preference or paying premium wages. There's no reason religious workers should receive lesser protection than those covered by other accommodation statutes.
We know a significant difficulty or expense test works because several states, including New York and California, already apply that test for religious accommodations, and federal courts are well acquainted with applying that test under the ADA and other similar statutes. The court should establish a textual test for undue hardship and reverse the judgment below. I welcome the court's questions.
Uh just a couple of cleanup questions. Uh what was actually decided uh was the uh law being considered in Hardison? Was it the the Title VI as amended or was it a guideline?
It was the EEOC guideline that implemented the pre amendment statute.
So the law actually was not interpreted in in in Hardison.
That's correct, Your Honor, because the events in Hardison arose before the statute was amended and the court squarely stated that it was applying the guideline.
Uh the other thing is um You say that the government is not making the de minimis argument. Uh so what is the daylight between your argument now and the government's argument? Sure.
It is best Explained by what the government thinks arises to the level of an undue hardship. They use a variety of different formulations, but when the rubber meets the road, that's where we see the daylight. And we see that the government believes that any loss of efficiency is going to be an undue hardship. Any regular payment of premium wages, for example, paying overtime to one person per week to attract that person to cover a Sabbatarian shift. The denial of a single co worker's secular preference, according to the government, is an undue hardship. So when we take all of that together, while the government's test might sound better than Hardisons on its face, it would have the effect of eviscerating certainly any sabotarian observance, which was at the very core of what the Court uh what the Congress was trying to protect.
So the one final question. Uh the it seems a little odd that under the ADA we have the same term, undue hardship. And I know there's a definition of undue hardship there, but it seems as though that there would at least be some uh comparison to uh the undue hardship, uh the treatment of undue hardship under ADA and there'd be some similarity with Title Seven. So would you comment on that?
Yes, Your Honor. There is right now a huge gap between the accommodations allowed under the ADA and the accommodations allowed under Hardisan.
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Chapters
8 chapters
1
What is the central dispute over the “undue hardship” standard in Groff v. DeJoy?
0:00–12:41
2
How does the petitioner criticize the Hardison de minimis test and propose a “significant difficulty or expense” standard?
12:41–25:47
3
What arguments does the government present for its new “loss of efficiency”‑based test of undue hardship?
25:47–39:06
4
How do the justices question the relevance of coworker morale and shift‑preference impacts to the hardship analysis?
39:06–53:47
5
In what ways does the discussion compare the Title VII hardship test to the ADA’s “substantial cost” standard?
53:47–1:07:13
6
What hypothetical scenarios (e.g., Sabbath‑observant employee, premium wages) are used to illustrate the test’s application?
1:07:13–1:20:22
7
How do the parties find common ground on the three accommodation “buckets” and the need for a context‑specific approach?
1:20:22–1:33:38
8
What is the final recommendation on whether the Court should overturn Hardison or adopt a clarified textual test?
1:33:38–1:47:50