Harrow v. Dept. of Defense (23-21)

argument 23-21

Harrow v. Dept. of Defense

Supreme Court of the United States 50 min 8 speakers 8 chapters transcribed 8 days ago official recording ↗

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What is the central dispute over the filing deadline in Harrow v. Dept. of Defense?

John G. Roberts 0:00

We'll hear argument next in case twenty three twenty one, Harrow versus the Department of

John P. Davis 0:04

Defense. Mr. Davis? Mr Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. Over the past twenty years or so. This Court has clarified the law to prevent ordinary procedural rules, like filing deadlines, from being misinterpreted as jurisdictional, contrary to congressional intent. The clear statement rule governs that analysis. That rule demands a clear statement from Congress on par with explicit language to establish a jurisdictional requirement. At issue here is whether five USC Section seven hundred seven zero three B one A's filing deadline is jurisdictional. Nothing in the text of B one A suggests that it is. That can end the inquiry. That conclusion is confirmed by the text of the relevant jurisdictional statute twenty eight USC section twelve ninety five A.

John P. Davis 1:01

As relevant here, Section twelve ninety five A nine creates jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit over appeals quote pursuant to close quote Section seven hundred seven oh three B one. Pursuant to is a notoriously ambiguous phrase. Nevertheless, the government claims that the only plausible interpretation of pursuant to is as necessitating that all the requirements of B one A are satisfied. Pursuant to can mean invoking B one, not satisfying its filing deadlines. That is how this Court interpreted interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in ru in removal cases in BP PLC in twenty twenty one. It held that pursuant to means invoking a particular statutory provision not satisfying its requirements. Using this compelling interpretation or a similar one

John P. Davis 1:55

B one A's filing deadline is not jurisdictional. That interpretation is at least plausible. So, under the clear statement rule, the E one A's filing deadline is a mere claims processing rule. I would welcome any questions from the Court.

Clarence Thomas 2:13

Going back to that provision, why isn't it seventy seven oh three? Why isn't this controlled by Lindell?

John P. Davis 2:20

It is not controlled by Lindell for a few reasons. One, uh Lindell did not specifically address at all the filing deadline provision. It spoke only in loose jurisdictional terms. And so uh and this Court in Wilkins and Santo Zachariah has asked for a much more specific ruling in order for the an inference that the clear statement rule Is satisfied. In addition, Lindahl didn't impose a jurisdictional requirement at all. It actually read the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit broadly. It interpreted the relevant statute to say that not only the employees and applicants for employment are able to bring claims under 7703 B1A, but so are the employees. retirees, even though they're not mentioned explicitly.

John P. Davis 3:12

So 1985, Lindahl, is not a dr it doesn't specifically address this provision or a filing deadline whatsoever. And in addition, it is the sort of loose jurisdictional language that the clear statement rule is designed to clean up.

John G. Roberts 3:29

Well we know that one area where uh jurisdiction is uh uh uh enforced rigorously is from one level of uh court to another, right? From the district court to Court of Appeals. Why does it m it make sense to have a totally different rule when it's from an agency to the Court of Appeals?

John P. Davis 3:48

She a couple of reasons. First of all, in Bowles, the reason that the Court adopted this approach was a long history of this type of notice of appeal from an Article III Court to an Article III Court. Now, this Court has repeatedly said that Bowles and that general rule should not be read beyond the Article III to Article III context, including in Hamer and in Fort Ben Fort. And then more generally, there's not only a different statute at play here, one of much more recent vintage, but also there is a very different jurisdictional posture. One of the things this Court has said repeatedly in interpreting filing deadlines and other potentially jurisdictional provisions is to look at the nature of the litigation process that it is coming from.

John P. Davis 4:39

The MSPB process, much like this court, like the veterans uh approach in uh Henderson or like the adversarial approach uh in for the IRS uh in Beckler, is a much more lenient approach.